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Two significant phenomena emerge from recent internet development: 
consumers are influenced by social network; and consumers engage in consumption 
and production of user-generated content.  This dissertation studies social influence 
and social media.   
In Chapter 1, we study how summer internship employer choices of MBA 
students at a major university are influenced by the choices made by their fellow 
students. We develop a simultaneous model of each individual’s choice as a function 
of other students’ choices. Our model of interdependence in decision making is 
structural and equilibrium-based. Also, the model is general enough to allow both 
positive and negative effects of average group choices on any individual’s decision. 
The structure of our data enables us to identify endogenous social effects separately 
from exogenous or correlated effects.  Specifically, in our data we see each student 
making choices about whether or not to apply for each job opening; exogenous and 
correlated effects do not vary in this sample and therefore endogenous effects are 
identified. We employ a two-stage procedure to address the endogeneity of choices: 
we estimate empirical choice probabilities in the first stage, and taste parameters for 
employer attributes and peer influence in the second stage. Our results show that as 
expected, students prefer jobs with strong employer attributes (e.g. high salary, large 
firm size). In addition, students are influenced by their peers’ choices. However, in 
contrast to previous studies, we find negative (rather than positive) social effects. That 
is, strong attributes also make an internship employer less attractive, leading to a lower 
 choice probability relative to cases of zero or positive social effects.  This negative 
social effect is consistent with congestion, i.e. students are aware that a good 
internship will attract the interest of more students, thus lowering the odds of getting 
it.  We find that these negative social effects are stronger for students with more work 
experience and stronger GMAT scores. While positive social effect leads to 
concentration of choices, negative social effect helps prevent concentration.   
In chapter 2, we analyze how large content-sharing websites operate for 
companies like Google and Yahoo.  A content website provider needs to understand 
content users to achieve different objectives.  Consumers searching content take 
sampling probability as given in deciding consumption, and producers are motivated 
by endorsement.  Sampling probability is a key policy instrument.  Endorsement may 
explain why a small number of producers generate most content.  Individual behaviors 
alone cannot explain genesis and persistence of sampling probability and endorsement.  
Two distinguishing features of content—being free and non-rival preclude application 
of celebrated market equilibrium theory.  We develop a content equilibrium from first 
principles.  Consumer and producer can be compatible, and their interaction gives rise 
to endogenous sampling probability and endorsement.  Inequality arises: higher 
quality producers always earn more endorsement and produce more content; and 
higher quality content is easier to find.  Content system is optimal for consumer 
welfare despite inequality.  Content system possesses a self-organization property to 
find equilibrium from other less desired states.  We use this framework to show policy 
conflict may arise due to content firm’s multiple identities.  
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Chapter 1  Modeling Endogenous Social Effects: An Application to 
MBA Student Summer Internship Employer Choices 
1.1  Introduction 
Modeling consumer choice is a cornerstone of research in marketing.  
Marketers have developed sophisticated choice models where consumer choice is a 
function of firm actions, product characteristics over time, a consumer’s own past 
choices, consumer heterogeneity etc.  More recently, marketers have explored how 
consumer choices can be functions of choices made by other consumers (e.g., Yang 
and Allenby 2003, Yang et al. 2006, Manchanda et al. 2008, Van den Bulte and Joshi 
2007, Hartmann forthcoming). Adding to this stream of literature, we study how MBA 
student choices of summer internship employers are influenced by the choices made 
by their fellow students. Ubiquity of information and technology has made it easier for 
individuals to influence, and to be influenced by, choices of other individuals. While 
our application is to MBA summer internship employer choices, the model we propose 
is general enough to be applicable to various technology-mediated environments 
where marketers can expect more opportunities for interdependencies in decision 
making.   
Social effects may lead to similar observed behaviors among group members.  
But not all such similarities are due to social effects.  Manski (1993) provides the 
following classification of reasons for observed interdependencies. First, individual 
choices might be directly influenced by the choices of individuals around them (e.g. in 
our case, MBA students’ job choices are directly influenced by their fellow students’ 
choices). Manski calls this interdependency the endogenous social effect, and we 
model this phenomenon in our paper. Second, individual choices might vary with 
exogenous characteristics of the group being studied (e.g. the socio-economic 
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composition of MBA students; these have also been termed contextual effects in the 
sociology literature).  Choices of individuals with similar characteristics can be similar 
and hence be mistaken for endogenous effects. Finally, individual choices in a group 
are correlated with choices of others in the group because they face similar 
environments (e.g. MBA students have all taken the same required classes and might 
choose to apply to similar firms based on their professors’ recommendations).  
Correlated effects in the data can also be mistaken for endogenous effects.  
Endogenous and exogenous effects both describe the social environment of decision 
makers, whereas correlated effects capture non-social phenomena that cause 
interdependent choices. 
Distinguishing between different reasons for interdependence of individual 
decisions is important. Consider an intervention wherein potential employers or 
business-school administrators provide more detailed information to a certain group of 
students to enable better decision making. The impact of this detailed information 
provision will be felt in two ways. First, it will affect the decisions of the students who 
receive direct communication from employers or school administrators.  Second, 
employer/administrator intervention will also have a “multiplier”1 effect given other 
students’ decisions will then be affected via endogenous effects.  Exogenous and 
correlated effects do not lead to such multiplier effects.  Therefore, researchers run the 
risk of misestimating the impact of an intervention if they do not isolate the 
endogenous effects.  
An important distinction within endogenous social effects is whether these 
effects are positive or negative.  With positive social effects, an agent’s utility from a 
product or activity increases when peers make the same choice. Such positive 
interaction can lead to concentration of choices on particular alternatives, e.g., in 
                                                 
1
 A formal definition of social multiplier can be found in Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003) .  
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consumer purchases (Yang and Allenby 2003, Hartmann forthcoming), in TV viewing 
(Yang et al. 2006), and in drug prescription behavior (Manchanda et al. 2008, Van den 
Bulte and Joshi 2007).  One common explanation for positive social effects is 
conformity.  Less discussed but equally important is negative social interaction 
wherein an agent’s utility decreases in peers’ choices. One explanation for negative 
interaction is status seeking. Consumers purchase exclusive goods to achieve prestige 
(Amaldoss and Jain 2003).  Another explanation is congestion (Manski 2000 calls it 
constraint interaction).  Multiple agents share a resource, and their choices collectively 
determine the availability of the resource.  Constraint interaction is especially 
plausible in our context where students might fear getting crowded out of popular 
jobs. Therefore they might not apply to popular jobs they would have found attractive 
in the absence of congestion effects.  Of course, popular jobs are likely to have 
features that are attractive (e.g. higher salary) and therefore, any student will have to 
balance job attractiveness with the likelihood of greater competition from other 
students for this job. Positive and negative social interactions are not mutually 
exclusive.  When a diner considers a busy restaurant, he may both be attracted by the 
popularity while being concerned about table availability.  So the estimated social 
interaction inferred from empirical data is the net effect of both positive and negative 
interactions. 
The distinction between positive and negative endogenous social effects is an 
important one from a policy perspective.  With negative endogenous effects, a 
prestigious firm might get fewer applicants than it would without negative effects.  
Therefore, the firm needs to make a more concerted effort to seek out the most 
desirable applicants and convince them to apply.   Econometrically, a researcher may 
over-estimate (under-estimate) the effect of product characteristics in the presence of 
positive (negative) social interaction if the measurement does not account for social 
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interactions and allow for both positive and negative social interactions in the model. 
Our empirical setting of internship employer choices of MBA students at a 
leading university is well-suited for the study of endogenous social effects. Most MBA 
programs have various planned avenues for social interactions within (and outside) the 
student body (e.g. happy hours, club activities, etc.).  There are several benefits from 
such social interactions.  First, through such interactions, students acquire industry and 
company-specific information from their peers with experience in these industries and 
from peers looking for similar jobs. Second, such interactions help students establish 
career contacts. This is especially true for students who switch careers (e.g. scientists 
wanting to become marketers) or even switch firms (e.g. moving from a small market 
research company to a larger company).  Given our empirical application is the 
summer internship search, and these internships often play a central role in 
determining students’ full-time job offers, social interactions where information and 
contacts can be gleaned are likely to be important.  In other words, social interactions 
in the context of summer internship search are consequential, given the significant 
economic consequences of making a sound choice. Therefore, it appears plausible that 
social interactions lead to the existence of endogenous social effects in this choice 
setting; a complete model of student internship choice should account for these.   
As we will explain in detail in Section 1.3, our model builds on and extends 
existing empirical literature in the following ways.  We model endogenous social 
effects in a multi-person setting, without placing any restrictions on who might be 
influenced by whom, instead modeling any one person’s decision as potentially being 
influenced by all others’ decisions.  To do this, we have to relax the assumption of 
perfect information about other individuals’ preferences, an assumption that is 
commonly made in extant literature. This assumption also makes our model applicable 
to decision-making settings where decision-makers are unlikely to have full 
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information on other decision-makers, and where decision dependencies are more than 
two-person wide. Our model is general enough to allow for both positive and negative 
social effects, and allow for heterogeneity in the intensity of social effects across 
students. Our methodological contribution is to empirically implement Blume (1993) 
and Brock and Durlauf’s (2001) theoretical models of endogenous social effects. We 
employ a two-stage procedure (Manski and Wise 1983, Hotz and Miller 1993, Bajari 
et al. forthcoming) to estimate a system of simultaneous choice equations for all 
students, where each student’s choice is a function of others’ choices.  Importantly, in 
our data we are able to identify the endogenous social effects separately from the two 
confounding effects discussed previously.  Our empirical setting involves a single 
group in which exogenous and correlated effects do not vary in the data.   
Substantively, we find that endogenous social effects exist and vary by student 
characteristics.  As expected, strong internship employer attributes (e.g. high salary, 
large firm size) attract the students.  However, in contrast to previous studies, we find 
negative (rather than positive) social effects. That is, strong attributes also make an 
internship employer less attractive via the social effect, leading to a lower choice 
probability relative to cases of zero or positive social effects. This negative social 
effect is consistent with congestion, i.e. student choices for an internship collectively 
determine the likely availability of the internship to any student.  Stronger students 
(higher GMAT scores, more work experience) have larger negative social effects than 
other students. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 1.2, we describe the 
literature in this area.  In section 1.3, we describe the data and present the proposed 
model.  In section 1.4, we discuss model identification and the estimation procedure. 
In section 1.5, we present empirical results.  Section 1.6 concludes.  
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1.2  Related Literature 
In this section, we examine research in economics and marketing on modeling 
social effects. Social effects have been used in economics to explain a variety of 
phenomena, including crime rates in neighborhoods (Glaeser et al. 1996) and army 
desertions (DePaula 2009). 
As noted, the literature recognizes that these effects can be positive, (e.g. 
conforming behavior (Jones 1984)), or negative (e.g. status seeking (Frank 1985)). 
Akerlof (1997) describes conformity as individuals moving towards each other in a 
social space. Benefits that individuals receive from conformity include love, 
friendship, and monetary payoffs. Individuals may distance themselves from others to 
avoid negative consequence of closeness, such as jealousy and envy of friends, 
relatives, and neighbors.  Another seminal paper in this area is Blume (1993), who 
presents one of the earliest social interaction models built on individual-level decision 
processes. His model draws from mean-field theory in statistical mechanics (see 
Stanley 1971 for a description). In a system with many interacting individuals, the 
effects of the system on an individual can be captured by average behavior of the 
group (mean field). Blume (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2002) apply mean 
field theory to a discrete choice model.  They assume that economic agents form 
expectations on group behavior, and such expectation is consistent with actual 
outcome.2  
In one of the early papers in this stream in marketing, Yang and Allenby 
(2003) examine whether there are interdependencies in consumers’ automobile 
purchase decisions.  Using data on purchases of midsize cars, they specify a 
consumer’s choice as a function of car prices, features of cars, and income.  They use 
                                                 
2
 A related model is supermodular game model (Topkis 1979, Milgrom and Roberts 1990).  For an 
example of using supermodular game solution in social effects, see Krauth (2006).   
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a spatial error model to allow the error terms in the utility function to be correlated 
across individuals. The strength of the correlation depends on geographic or social 
distance (e.g. similar demographics) between individuals. They find that geographic 
distance explains the correlation better than demographic distances.  Yang et al. 
(2006) examine spouses’ television program choices.  They model a viewer’s utility as 
a linear function of the partner’s utility by using a spatial autoregressive model. An 
important distinction between these two papers and ours is that we are able to identify 
endogenous social effects separately from exogenous and correlated effects. A further 
point of contrast is that our model is equilibrium-based, as we will discuss in further 
detail in section 1.3.   
 Manchanda et al. (2008) consider social effects in the adoption of a new 
product.  They model physicians’ adoption of a new drug as a function of average 
prescription behavior of the peer group in the previous time period, assuming a 
unidirectional social effect. In other words, a logical condition is imposed in the model 
that earlier adopters influence those who have not yet adopted, and any reciprocal 
influence is irrelevant because the early adopters have already made their choices.  
Nair et al. (2006) also model physician peer effects.  A unique feature of their data is 
that physicians self-identify their social networks. This allows the authors to assume 
that opinion leaders influence others, but are not influenced by others. This 
unidirectionality or asymmetry of social effects is similar to the Manchanda et al. 
(2008) formulation.  Our formulation, wherein any student’s choices can influence and 
be influenced by others’ choices is different from both the Nair et al. and Manchanda 
et al. formulations.  Our model is therefore applicable to situations where self-
identification of social networks is unavailable, or where the researcher believes that 
latent networks exist in addition to self-identified ones. 
The paper closest to ours is Hartmann (forthcoming) who studies positive 
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endogenous social effects in a two-person golf-partner pair setting and finds evidence 
for endogenous effects. Our model is similar in that it focuses on endogenous social 
effects and can be interpreted as the equilibrium outcome of a game. However, in 
contrast with Hartmann, our model applies to multi-person settings, allows for both 
positive and negative endogenous social effects, and relaxes the assumption of perfect 
information about everyone else’s tastes.   
1.3  Model 
In our application to MBA students’ summer internships application choices, 
we treat the entire first-year class applying for summer internships as the relevant 
group that potentially influences the decisions of each student. While each individual 
in the class can belong to multiple sub-groups for the purpose of internship application 
process (e.g. clubs for specific career paths, ethnic/gender-based social networks, etc.), 
we do not have a priori information that would allow us to choose particular sub-
groups as being especially relevant to the decision being modeled. Furthermore, the 
class size of 221 students is relatively small compared with several other top-ranked 
MBA programs, making it reasonable to assume that social interaction might occur 
among the entire class3. As the model is specified for our data context, we first discuss 
the data and subsequently present the model. 
1.3.1 Data  
In most leading business schools, a number of companies recruit for summer 
internship positions on campus each year. These internships are heterogeneous in 
many ways. For example, they differ by industry, size, compensation, etc. In most 
                                                 
3
 An extension of our model is to relax the assumption of the entire class being the relevant social 
group, and instead allow for endogenous group formation (e.g., Zanella 2007). We discuss this in the 
concluding section of the paper.   
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two-year MBA programs, students work as interns in their first summer, and apply for 
permanent jobs in the second year. We collect data on resume submissions for 
internships in 2006 by the first-year class at a major business school. Recruitment is 
formally organized through the Career Management Center (CMC). The CMC posts 
all available internship opportunities in its database. Each student then chooses 
whether or not to submit a resume to each posted internship employer.  
Descriptive statistics of the 221 students in the first-year class are in Table 1. 
Demographic information includes gender, nationality, and work experience. The 
class profile reflects a diverse student body with about 30% female students, 26% 
international students, and average work experience of around 5 years. We report two 
sets of indicators of academic performance: GPA, and GMAT scores on verbal, 
quantitative, and analytical writing sections. Students have higher quantitative scores 
than verbal scores on average, and the standard deviations for the two are about the 
same. The variation in student characteristics suggests the need to model potential 
heterogeneity in student tastes.  
One hundred and eight firms recruit interns through CMC.4 For each firm, each 
student makes a binary decision- whether or not to submit a resume.  Therefore, we 
consider each firm as a separate choice observation with each student’s choice set 
including the decisions to submit a resume or not.  We include the fifty eight publicly 
traded firms in our sample since their information is publicly available.5 Using CMC's 
categorization, the fifty-eight internship positions included in our sample belong to 
three industry categories: manufacturing, consulting, and finance. Since we have only 
four consulting firms in the data, we reclassify all firms in the dataset into two 
categories: finance vs. non-finance, by including the four consulting firms in the non-
                                                 
4
 Some firms offer multiple internship positions, and some students also get internships through off-
campus channels.  
5
 With regard to the estimation of social effects and students’ choice behavior, we believe the omission 
of privately held firms from our sample should not create a bias.  
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finance category. Thirty-five percent of internship positions are in the finance 
category. We include as a covariate average salaries received by previous graduates 
who joined a recruiting company in a permanent position. Annual sales of the 
recruiting company serve as a proxy for company size.  We observe large 
heterogeneity in company size. 
Table 1  Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Student Characteristics 
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.70 0.46 
Nationality (1=domestic, 0=international) 0.74 0.44 
Work experience (in number of years) 4.7 2.5 
GMAT verbal score 37.73 4.70 
GMAT quantitative score 44.57 4.64 
GMAT Analytical writing score (AWA) 4.86 0.69 
GMAT total score 674.5 49.70 
GPA 3.42 0.31 
Company Characteristics 
Industry (1=finance, 0=non-finance) 0.35 0.48 
Annual Salary of previous full-time recruits (in $1000) 93.26 8.95 
Annual sales (in million $) 45.75 51.83 
 
1.3.2 A Model of Binary Choice with Social Effects 
In this section, we describe a binary choice model with endogenous social 
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effects for the data discussed previously. Let ,I J denote the total numbers of MBA 
students and summer internship employers.  Each individual (a student in our 
empirical application) {1,..., }i I∈ decides whether to apply to a summer 
internship {1,..., }j J∈ . Let {0,1}ija ∈ denote the binary decision with 1 indicating the 
decision to apply, and 0 otherwise. The action ija  reveals the latent utility iju  that an 
application to internship j  brings to individual i  such that 
1 if 
0 other e
0
wis
ij
ij
u
a
>
=



      (1) 
Let ... {0,1}}{{0,1}A = × × denote the set of actions of all I individuals.  Let 
1( ,..., )j j Ija a Aa = ∈  denote the joint actions of all individuals with respect to 
internship employer j . Let ija− denote the joint actions of all individuals except i with 
respect to internship employer j. Let KjX R∈ denote K attributes of employer j.  Let 
j Rξ ∈ denote an employer-specific variable. Then the latent utility is specified as 
follows: 
0 0 1
i
ij i j j i lj ij
l i
u X a
I
γβ β ξ β
≠
≡ + + + +
−
+ ∑ ε   (2) 
where 0β denotes an overall intercept term, 0iβ denotes an individual i  specific 
intercept term, 1,...,( )ii Kiβ β β≡ represents coefficients for the attributes of internship 
employers , iγ is the coefficient for endogenous social effects, and ijε is a private utility 
shock.  The private utility shock ijε is unknown to the other individuals or the 
researchers. Let 0 0( , , ),i i iβ β β γΘ ≡ denote the parameter set. The covariates jX  are 
assumed to be observed by individuals as well as researchers and are included in the 
model to control for differences in attractiveness of internship employers. The 
employer-specific effects jξ   represent employer characteristics that are common 
knowledge to all individuals, but unobserved to researchers. These might include, for 
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instance, reputation of employers for making permanent job offers upon successful 
completion of the summer internship. Note that the individual specific intercept 0iβ  
includes any time cost of preparing and submitting a resume.  
The term / ( 1)lj
l i
a I
≠
−∑  in equation (2) expresses the average choice of the 
group except individual i. Individuals only have access to their own information in the 
Career Management Center database. So, individuals do not directly observe the 
average choice of other individuals in their class. Nor do they have information on 
past years’ choices.  Instead, they form an expectation on the average choice. Brock 
and Durlauf (2001) refer to the term / ( 1)i lj
l i
a Iγ
≠
−∑  as social utility, and 
0 0j i j i ijXβ ξ β β+ ++ + ε  as private utility. In Manski’s (1993) classification 
/ ( 1)i lj
l i
a Iγ
≠
−∑  is termed endogenous effects. 
We model the heterogeneity in individual taste parameters βi
 
as a function of 
individual characteristics such as demographics, work experience, and academic 
performance. Let MiZ ∈ℝ  denote a row vector of these M covariates. Let iZ  denote a 
1K +  by ( 1)K M+ × matrix.  In the thr row, put iZ  between column ( 1) 1Mr − × + and 
column r M× .  All the other elements in iZ  are zero. The heterogeneous tastes, 
,( )i i iω β γ≡  are specified as 
 i o i iZω α α ψ+ +=  (3) 
where 
,1 , 1( ,..., )To o o Kα α α += is a population level intercept for the K employer attributes 
and social effects, and 1,1 ,1 1, 1 , 1, ..., , ..., ,...( )M K M Kα α α α α+ +≡ denotes population level 
coefficients. We assume that iψ follows an iid Normal distribution such 
that ( ) 0iE ψ = , ( )i i iE ψ ψ ρ= , and ( ) 0i jE ψ ψ = for i j≠ .   
With regard to the endogenous effects, an alternative approach is to specify 
them as a function of peer utilities (Yang et al. 2006) instead of peer actions.  The two 
specifications (peer utilities versus actions) make different assumptions about the 
information available to decision makers. We make the following assumption about 
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the information structure of an individual’s knowledge of others’ utilities: we assume 
that individual 2’s private utility shock is known to individual 1. In our empirical 
application, the class size of 221 is too large to justify this assumption, hence we 
assume that i ’s utility shock is indeed private to i and not known to peers.  
We make the following assumption about the private utility shock.  
Assumption 1: The private utility shock ijε is independently and identically distributed 
across individuals and internships.  Let ( )ijF ε denote the cumulative density function 
of ijε . We assume that group members know the distribution ( )ijF ε .  Note that 
independence in the private shock is a reasonable assumption because we explicitly 
model correlation in the non-private or social portion of utility. 
Next we discuss the individual decision making process.  Equations (1) and (2) 
together define a decision function ( , , ( )) : {0 1, }| ,Ki j j ij ijD X Fξ Θ × × →ℝ ℝ ℝε ε , 
mapping from internship employer attributes (both observed and unobserved to 
researchers) and i ’s private utility shock, to i ’s action. Note that the peers’ utility 
shocks ljε for l i≠ , are unknown to i . So they do not enter in to the decision 
function ( , , , ( )| )i j j ij ijD X Fξ Θε ε .  Recall that endogenous effects are specified as a 
function of peer choices.  The decision function implies that i  does not know her 
peers’ decisions exactly.  Instead, by assumption 1, she can estimate the expectation of 
peer decisions because she knows the distribution ( )ijF ε .   
The probability that individual i chooses to apply to internship employer j is 
computed by integrating the decision function over ( )ijF ε : 
( ) (1| , , , , ( )| ) ( )ij ij j j i j j ij ij ijP a X D X F dFξ ξ= = Θ∫ ε ε ε     (4) 
Taking expectation of the utility in Eq. (2) and by the independence in assumption 1, 
we obtain the expected utility for individual i : 
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0 0 ,1
( 1| )iij i j j i lj lj j j ij
l i
au X P X
I
γβ β ξ β ξ
≠
+ == + + + +
−
∑ɶ ε    (5) 
where ijuɶ denotes the expected utility. Expected utility maximization implies 
0, |( 1 | , ) Pr( , 0)1 ( 1 | )
i
ij ij j j ij ij o i j j i lj lj j j ij
l i
P a X X P X
I
a
γξ β β ξ β ξ
≠
= = ++ + =+ + >
−
∑ε ε ε
(6) 
Next we make a distributional assumption on ijε to obtain an analytical form for the 
choice probability. 
Assumption 2: ( )ijF ε is a Type I extreme value distribution, i.e. the density function 
is 2)( ) (1
ij
ijij
ef
e
−
−
=
+
ε
ε
ε .   
To simplify notation, we write ( 1| ),,ij ij j j ijP a X ξ= ε as ( 1)ij ijP a = . With assumption 2, 
we obtain the following choice probabilities: 
0 0
0 0
exp( ( 1))
1( 1) ,  {1,..., }
1 exp( ( 1))
1
i
j i j i lj lj
l i
ij ij
i
j i j i lj lj
l i
X P a
IP a i I
X P a
I
γβ ξ β β
γβ ξ β β
≠
≠
+ =
−
= = ∀ ∈
+
+ + +
+ + =
−
+ +
∑
∑
 
(7) 
The choice probability in Eq. (7) resembles that of a standard logit choice model.  The 
difference is that choice probabilities of peers enter on the right hand side of equation 
(7).  There are I equations for each internship j , and they define an implicit function 
for choice probabilities 1( ,..., )j IjP P .   
 The proposed model has a game-theoretic interpretation if we treat the 
applications to each internship employer j as a game (in other words, we observe 
J games in total).  Consider the game played by all individuals applying for a 
particular internship.  We will describe a single incomplete information game or 
Bayesian game. The strategic form jΓ of a Bayesian game j is defined by 
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, ( ({ , ( ) , , )) ( ) , },j ij i S ij ij ij ij i S ij i Su a aa pS ∈ − ∈ ∈Γ ≡ ε ε  where {1,..., }S I= denotes the set of 
individuals; and ijε denotes the type of individual i ; ija denotes the strategy set; 
iju denotes payoff function or utility; and p denotes joint probability distribution for 
types.  The type ijε expresses private information only available to i .  Per assumption 
1, the joint probability distribution on 1( ,..., )j Ijε ε is common knowledge to all 
individuals. Then an individual i can compute the expected payoff (5) using the joint 
probability p .  The choices ija s are pure strategies in the Bayesian game in the sense 
that each ija maximizes i ’s expected payoff given peer choices ija− .   
1.3.3 Existence and Multiplicity of Equilibrium Choice Probabilities   
Social interaction implies that choices are interdependent.  The 
interdependency is captured by the system of equations (7).  In another words, the 
choice probabilities ijp are solutions to the equations (7).  Note that if social effects do 
not exist, the equations (7) reduce to I independent equations 
 
0 0
0 0
exp(( 1) ,  {1,..., }
1 e
)
xp( )
j i j i
ij ij
j i j i
X
P a i I
X
β ξ β β
β ξ β β
+ + +
+
= ∀
+ +
=
+
∈
 (8) 
Each of these equations is a standard single agent choice model. In this model 
existence or multiplicity of equilibria are not concerns.  These factors are also not a 
concern for unidirectional social interactions, i.e. interaction between a leader and 
followers.  The leader’s choice is modeled as in a regular choice model, given she 
does not care about followers’ choices. The leader’s choice can be treated as 
exogenous to followers’ choices. Examples of unidirectional social effects are time 
lagged social effects (Manchanda et al. 2008), and asymmetric social effects between 
opinion leaders and followers (Nair et al. 2007).   
Multiplicity and existence become issues only when agents have mutual 
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influences. Note that Eq. (7) defines a mapping :[0,1] [0,1]I IG → such that 
( )j jP G P= , where 1 , ...,( )j j IjPP P≡ .  Since G  is continuous in jP , we can show the 
existence of at least one solution to jP  by Brouwer's fixed point theorem.  It is harder 
to characterize the number of solutions or equilibria; multiple solutions may exist for 
this non-linear equation system (Brock and Durlauf 2001).   
We illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria in such a system by a simulation.  
For this illustration we assume all individuals have the same taste parameter β in 
employer attributes, and γ in endogenous social effects.  So we have iβ β= and iγ γ= . 
We further assume that 0 0 0i jβ β ξ= = = without loss of generality.  Then Eq. (7) 
reduces to  
exp( ( 1))
1( 1) ,  
1 exp( ( 1))
1
j lj lj
l i
ij ij
j lj lj
l i
X P a
IP a i
X P a
I
γβ
γβ
≠
≠
+ =
− ∀
+ =
−
+
= =
∑
∑
     (9) 
 Further, we assume that the social utility can be approximated by 
( 1) / ( 1) ( 1) /lj lj lj l
l
j
l i
P a I P a Iγ γ
≠
= − ≈ =∑ ∑ . This assumption is reasonable when the 
number of individuals is large.  Under the aforementioned assumption that the taste 
parameters β  and γ  are the same for all individuals, the variation across individuals’ 
choices comes from the private utility shock ijε .  Note that ( 1) /lj l
l
jP a I=∑ is the 
aggregate choice probability, which can be interpreted as the percentage of the class 
that submits resumes to internship j .  By the assumption of identical distribution in 
Assumption 1, the choice probabilities are identical, i.e. 
' '
( ) ( 1),1ij ij i j i jP a P a ===
 
for all  and 'i i . To simplify notation, let ( 1)ij ijaPσ =≡ . Then 
( 1) ( 1) /ij ij
l
lj ljP Pa a Iσ = == =∑ .  So Eq. (7) implies  
 
exp( )
1 exp( )
j
j
X
X
β γσ
σ β γσ
+
=
+ +
 (10) 
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We define two functions 
 
1
2
( )
exp( )( )
1 exp( )
j
j
Xf
X
f σ σ
β γσ
σ β γσ
=
+
=
+ +
 (11) 
In Figure 1(various panels) we examine how the number of solutions to σ changes as 
a function of marginal social effects γ , holding jXβ  constant.  That is, we plot the 
two functions in (11) against the aggregate choice probabilityσ .  The points where the 
two functions intersect (i.e. fixed points) are solutions to the aggregate choice 
probability in Eq. (10).  In Figure 1, the horizontal axis is the choice probability in Eq. 
(10).  The vertical axis displays in Eq. (11).  Note that is the diagonal line from the 
origin in each graph.  The intersections of the two curves and are the fixed points.  
Notice the number of fixed points increases in the marginal social effect. We observe 
that when social effects γ  are negative ( 0γ < in Figure 1.a), or there are no social 
effects ( 0γ =  in Figure 1.b), the solution is unique.   
Proposition 1.1: The solution to Eq. (10) is unique when 0γ ≤  
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Multiple solutions of choice probability appear under positive social effects.  As γ  
increases and passes a threshold ( 3γ ≈  in Figure 1.f), we observe two solutions.  And 
asγ increases further, we observe three solutions ( 3.5γ =  in Figure 1.g). If an 
individual expects her peers to make a particular choice with high probability, her 
choice probability is also high.  If she expects her peers’ choice probability to be low, 
her choice probability is also low. Such coordination makes multiple solutions 
possible. Brock and Durlauf (2001) provide a proof on the maximum number of 
solutions (see their Proposition 2).  
The multiplicity of equilibria does not occur in the presence of negative social 
effects.  When an individual expects peer choice probability is high, she will lower her 
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own probability, and vice versa. There is a breakdown of the coordination of choices 
(to reach the same choice as peers) that is present in positive social effects scenario. 
Similarly, when there is no social effect, the feedback mechanism necessary for 
multiple solutions no longer exists. So choice probability is unique for negative or 
zero social effects.  
Figure 1   Existence and Multiplicity of Choice Probability as a Function of Marginal 
Social Effects. 
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The social multiplier phenomenon is also illustrated in the simulation. 
Intuitively, the more favorable an internship j ’s attributes jX , the more likely 
individual i is to apply to this internship. Individual i’s decision then contributes to the 
average group choice, and the average choice in turn influences peer decisions.  Note 
that in the simulation we assume that individuals have the same taste parameters β  
andγ ; jX is invariant across these simulations. When there are no social effects 
(i.e. 0γ =  in Figure 1.b), the aggregate choice probability is 0.5. When there are 
positive social effects, for example when 1γ =  in Figure 1.c, we observe that 
aggregate choice probability σ  is greater than 0.6. As social effects cross the 
threshold of multiple solutions ( 3γ ≈  in Figure 1.f), the largest solution of aggregate 
choice probability continues to grow.  However, the other two solutions of aggregate 
choice probability are lower than 0.5 in Figure 1.g.   So the increase in the aggregate 
choice probability is entirely due to the social effects, thereby illustrating the social 
multiplier effect.  
1.4  Identification and Estimation 
1.4.1 Identification 
Multiple solutions (equilibria) of choice probability imply that the mapping 
from parameter space to sample space may not be one-to-one.  Existing literature 
typically assumes a one-to-one relationship exists. For example, Hartmann (2008) 
assumes that the best (Pareto optimal) equilibrium is played by individuals.  In our 
data, unique equilibrium is likely because of the larger heterogeneity in preferences 
due to large group size.  Brock and Durlauf 2001 (Proposition 2) shows that multiple 
equilibria appear when the social utility is relatively strong compared to private utility.   
In a larger group, group members are likely to have differences in tastes and 
private utility shocks.  So, the social effects tend to be weaker due to stronger private 
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utilities.  The simulation in Bajari et al. (forthcoming) shows that the occurrence of 
multiple equilibria decreases in the number of group members.  In a group with five 
members, single equilibrium appears ninety three percent of the time.  Therefore, in 
our empirical application with 221 students, it is reasonable to assume unique 
equilibrium.  Furthermore, our empirical results show negative social effects.  We 
have proved in proposition 1.1 that unique equilibrium exists in a negative social 
effects scenario.   
Next, we discuss identifying endogenous effects distinctly from exogenous and 
correlated effects.  The challenge of identifying endogenous effects is documented by 
Manski (1993) in the context of a linear model.  One source of difficulties in 
identification is the existence of multiple groups in the data. To the best of our 
knowledge, all existing papers model multiple groups. For example, in Manchanda et 
al. (2008), each physician identifies their social network, and these vary by physicians.  
We model the entire MBA class as the relevant social group that could influence 
choice.  Formally, let y denote characteristics of the group and iw denote covariates of 
individual i  in the group.  Then utility is expressed as 
 0 0 ( | )1
i
ij i j j lj i i
i
i i ij
l
a E wu y
I
X yγβ β ξ β δ ζ
≠
+ + + ++
−
= + +∑ ε  (12) 
This utility specification is the same as in Eq. (2) with two additional terms - 
( | )i iE w yδ  and i yζ  - which are used in existing papers to express exogenous effects 
and correlated effects respectively.  For example, y can be an indicator of a business 
school.  Students attending the same business school face the same institutional 
environments, such as facing the same travel distance to interviews at corporate sites.  
So if 0iζ ≠ , then correlated effects exist.  iw usually describes social and economic 
status, for example, racial composition in the landmark Colman et al. (1966) study on 
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school integration.  If 0iδ ≠ , exogenous effects exist. 
Assumption 3: The group attributes y and covariates ( | )iE w y are invariant over 
employer ,j for all j J∈ .   
Under assumption 3, 0iβ , ( | )i iE w yδ , and i yζ are not separable.  Therefore we obtain 
 0 0 1
i
ij i j j lj ij
l i
iu X aI
γβ β ξ β
≠
+ +
−
= + + +∑ ε   
In summary, the exogenous and correlated effects collapse into the individual specific 
parameter 0iβ .  They cannot be separately identified.  But they do not affect 
identification and estimation of the effect in which we are most interested, namely, the 
endogenous effects.   
The other identification assumptions are as follows. First, the global intercept 
in utility and dummy variables for firm fixed effects cannot all be identified.  We 
normalize the fixed effects of firm one to zero.  So the estimate of firm j ’s fixed 
effects should be interpreted as the difference between firm j  and firm one.  Second, 
since we have an overall intercept and individual specific intercepts, individual 
specific intercepts cannot all be identified. So we normalize individual specific 
intercept of individual one.  Third, the specification in equation (3) implies that 
j oZ α and jξ are not both identified. We discuss how to resolve this issue in the 
estimation section.  Fourth, we use scores on GMAT verbal, quantitative, and 
analytical writing sections, and omit the total score to avoid possible collinearity. 
1.4.2 Estimation 
The proposed binary choice model with social effects results in the 
simultaneous system of non-linear equations defined in (9).  We adopt the two-stage 
estimation methods used in Manski (1983), Hotz and Miller (1993) and Bajari et al. 
(forthcoming). Let ijV denote the deterministic part of the expected utility ijuɶ , defined 
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in Eq. (5). 
0 0 ),( 1|1
i
ij i j j i lj lj j j
l i
V X P X
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γβ β ξ β ξ
≠
≡ + + +
−
+ =∑     (13) 
The idea is that, in the first stage, we estimate choice probabilities ( 1)ij ijaP =  and infer 
ijV . Then we estimate the population level parameters in the second stage. We observe 
each individual make fifty eight binary choices (to apply or not for the internship), one 
for each internship employer j. In the first stage we apply non-parametric methods to 
separately estimate each individual’s empirical choice probability given a particular 
employer.  For a given internship employer j , the empirical choice probability is the 
conditional mean: 
P ( 1| ) ( 1 ), ,|ij ij j j ij j ja X E a Xξ ξ== =      (14) 
The employer-specific effects jξ  in the model represent characteristics that are 
common knowledge to all group members, but unobservable to researchers. 
Researchers usually assume that the internship fixed effect jξ  is a function of 
observed covariates (Newey 1994, Bajari et al. forthcoming); we make a similar 
assumption as follows.   
Assumption 4: jξ is a non-linear smooth function of jX .  
Therefore, we have 
, 1 | 1( 1| ) ( ) ( | )ij ij j j ij ij j ij jP a X P a E a X XXξ= = = == =
   
 (15) 
The goal is to estimate the choice probability ijP , which is a non-linear function of 
covariates jX .  We use a flexible functional form that can approximate the unknown 
non-linear function. Let ( | ) ( )ij j i jE a X m X≡  denote conditional mean, where ( )im ⋅  is 
an unknown non-linear function. This is equivalent to the following stochastic 
equation: 
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 ( ) ( )ij j i j ija X m X ζ= +  (16) 
where ( | ) 0, ( | ) 0 for all , ''ij j ij i j jE X E X i i j jζ ζ ζ ′ ′ ≠= ≠= . To illustrate the estimation, 
we consider our empirical setting. 1 2 3,( ),j j j jX X XX≡ where 1jX is a binary variable 
indicating whether the employer is in finance industry, 2jX  and 3jX are continuous 
variables measuring salary and firm size respectively. Then equation (16) is equivalent 
to  
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 1( , , ) ( , )1{ 0} ( , )1{ 1}ij j j j i j j j i j j j ija X X X m X X X m X X X ζ= = + = +  (17) 
where 1 2( ) and ( )i im m⋅ ⋅ are two nonlinear functions.  To enable estimation, we will 
approximate them with basis functions.  Consider 1 2 3( , )i j jm X X .  We can construct 
basis functions of a single variable, for example, 
11 2 2
{ ( ),..., ( )}j k jh X h X and 
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{ ( ),..., ( )}j k jl X l X  where { }ih and { }il are B-spline basis functions of single 
variables (Eilers and Marx 1996).  Then the tensor product spline is defined as 
2 3( ) ( )i j m jh X l X . The approximation for 1 2 3( , )i j jm X X is 
 
1 2
1 2 3 2
1 1
3( , ) ( ) ( )i j j im i j m
k k
m
j
i
m X hX X l Xθ
= =
=∑∑  (18) 
2( )im ⋅ can be similarly approximated by tensor product splines (see Wood 2006 for 
details). Hence equation (16) is reduced to a linear regression..   
 Given the estimated choice probability ijP , Hotz and Miller (1993) show that 
ˆ
ijV  can be computed from ijP . Equation (7) implies 
 
 ˆ log( ( 1| , )) log(1 ( 1| , ))ij ij ij j ij ij jV P a X P a X= = Θ − − = Θ  (19) 
The estimates ˆijP and ˆijV reduce the random utility model to an easy-to-estimate linear 
model.  
Next we estimate taste parameters.  Let ijτ denote sampling error for ˆijV . 
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where ijτ s have iid normal distribution, ~ (0, )ij N ττ Ω , ( )ij ij ijE τ τ σ= ,and ' '( ) 0ij i jE τ τ =  
if 
 or '' ji i j≠ ≠ Let / ( 1 ))ˆ( ,ij j lj
l i
PX NX
≠
≡ −∑ɶ .  
Combining equations (3) and (20), we obtain   
    0 0
ˆ
ij j i j i j i ijZV X Xβ ξ β α ψ τ+ + += + +ɶ ɶ ɶ
 
 (21) 
where 0j j jXξ ξ α+≡ ɶɶ . Equation (21) can be estimated by GLS detailed in Hsiao 
(2003). Finally we discuss how to identify jξ and 0α . We take the approach in Nevo 
(2000) and assume that ( | ) 0j jE Xξ =ɶ .  Let ˆjξɶ denote the estimated jξɶ , and V its 
variance and covariance matrix.  Then     
1 1 1
0
ˆ
ˆ ( )V X XVXα ξ− − −= ɶ ɶ ɶɶ
 
   (22) 
with 1 10ˆ (r( )= )Va XV Xα − −ɶ ɶ .  And 
    0
ˆ
ˆ
ˆj j Xξ ξ α−= ɶ ɶ
     
(23) 
1.5  Empirical Results 
1.5.1 Model Selection 
First we compare our model with benchmark specifications to show that it is 
important to include fixed internship effects and social effects.  In-sample and out-of-
sample model fit statistics are summarized in  
Table 2.. Considering first the in-sample results, the baseline homogenous logit 
model assumes that tastes for internship attributes are homogeneous across students 
and yields an Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) statistic of 73,446.24. Expectedly, 
the heterogenous logit model fits better with AIC of 67,943.77. Also, both the 
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heterogeneous logit model with fixed internship effects (but without social effects), 
and the heterogeneous logit with social effects, fit better than the heterogeneous logit 
model, as expected. Finally, the proposed heterogeneous logit model with both fixed 
internship effects and social effects has a better fit than all other specifications.  
We also compare three models in terms of out-of-sample fits: homogeneous 
logit, heterogeneous logit, and heterogeneous logit with social effects.  While the 
estimation sample consists of 221 MBA students and 40 internships, the hold-out 
sample consists of the same group of students but 18 other internships. This is because 
we need to estimate social effects as a function of all other students’ choices for any 
job, and therefore the hold-out sample cannot consist of students not included in the 
estimation sample.  The root mean square error shows that the heterogeneous logit 
with social effects predicts better than the heterogeneous logit model, and the 
heterogeneous logit performs better than the homogeneous logit.  Since the set of 
internship employers is different between the estimation and hold-out samples, 
estimates on internship employer fixed effects are unavailable for the hold-out sample. 
Therefore, out-of-sample fits cannot be computed for model specifications with fixed 
internship effects. 
Table 2  Model Fit 
Model # parameters (p) 
In-sample 
AIC* 
Out-of-sample 
RMSE** 
Homogeneous logit  4 73446.24 21.10 
Heterogeneous logit 237 67943.77 17.85 
Heterogeneous logit with social effects  244 67677.96 17.13 
Heterogeneous logit with fixed effects  276 67314.42 N/A 
Heterogeneous logit with fixed effects 
and social effects 283 67083.81 N/A 
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1.5.2 Effects of Internship Employer Attributes  
We discuss here the influence of internship employer attributes, namely industry, 
salary, and firm size, on students’ decisions to apply for an internship. We model 
students’ tastes for employer attributes as heterogeneous parameters, and project these 
parameters on demographic and other characteristics of students.  We first report the 
interaction of student characteristics and employer attributes.  The population-level 
estimates in Table 3  inform us how characteristics of students predict the marginal 
employer attribute effects.  We find that male and domestic students, relative to female 
and international students respectively, have larger marginal effects if an employer is 
from the finance industry.  In other words, internships in the finance industry attract 
more male and domestic student applicants. Male, domestic, and high GPA students 
have larger marginal effects of firm salary.  Similarly, male, domestic, higher GMAT 
quantitative scores, and higher GPA scores imply stronger effects of firm size.  
Next, we show the main effects of internship employer attributes.  For this 
purpose, we consider a representative student or individual denoted by *i .  The 
representative individual *i has the mean individual characteristics reported in Table 
1.  We define the main effects as the change in expected log odds of applying to an 
internship employer versus not applying, when we change one of the employer 
attributes by one unit, and keep the others constant. In other words, main effects are 
defined as 
    
*
* *
*
log ( )
1
i
i k ok i k
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P E Z
P
β α α∆ = +≡
−
   (24) 
where 
* *
log( / (1 ))i iP P∆ − denotes the change in expected log odds, *i kβ is the taste 
parameter of k th employer attribute for *i , 
*iZ is the characteristic vector of the 
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representative individual as indicated in Table 1, okα is defined in Eq. (3), and 
1 ,...( ),k k Mkα α α≡ where 1 ,...,( )k Mkα α  are defined in Eq. (3).  Since *iβ has a random 
component as shown in Eq. (3), we take expectation of 
*iβ .  We find that favorable 
employer characteristics - higher salary, and larger firm size, increase the expected log 
odds (Table 4).  Furthermore, an employer in the finance sector has higher odds of 
getting an internship application. 
 
Table 3 Interaction Effects of Student Demographics with Internship Employer 
Attributes 
 
Parameter Industry Salary Size 
  Mean Std. Error Pr(>|t|) Mean Std. Error Pr(>|t|) Mean Std. Error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept -4.867 1.930 ** -0.303 0.264  -0.165 0.045 *** 
Gender 4.036 0.937 *** 0.122 0.041 *** 0.018 0.007 ** 
International 2.808 1.013 *** -0.225 0.045 *** 0.020 0.008 ** 
experience 0.099 0.157  0.007 0.007  0.001 0.001  
GMAT V -0.082 0.094  0.005 0.004  0.000 0.001  
GMAT Q 0.058 0.103  -0.006 0.005  0.0014 0.0008 * 
GMAT AWA 0.548 0.594  -0.017 0.026  -0.008 0.005 *** 
GPA 1.532 1.411  0.184 0.062 *** 0.046 0.011 *** 
Table 4  Main Effects of Internship Employer Attributes on Probability of Choice 
 
Main Effect  Change in Expected Log Odds of Applying 
Finance relative to non-Finance Sector 0.036 
Increase in Annual Salary by $1000 0.546 
Increase in Firm Size by $1 Million 0.041 
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1.5.3 Negative Social Effects 
Next we discuss social effects. We project heterogeneous social effects onto 
student characteristics. We report the interaction of individual demographics and 
social influences in Table 5. The main social effects for the representative student 
*i can be computed by Eq. 24 and the estimates in  
Table 5. We find that the average marginal social effects are negative, in 
particular, 403.0−=γ .  Our results differ from the typical positive social effects 
findings in the marketing literature (Yang and Allenby 2003, Yang et al. 2006, 
Hartmann forthcoming). The endogenous social effects found in these studies describe 
conformity behavior, i.e. a consumer chooses goods that his neighbor, spouse, or golf 
partner also chooses.  Our empirical results provide a case for congestion.  Although 
the Career Management Center encourages all students to apply to each internship, 
students recognize that only a small number of students will obtain any given 
internship.   
Looking at the interactions of student characteristics with social effects, we 
find there is indeed heterogeneity in these effects.  Our investigation of the 
heterogeneity in social effects adds to the growing literature in sociology that studies 
social effects of specific segments of population.  For example, sociologists have used 
social network of men versus women to explain gender segregation of jobs (Fernandez 
and Sosa 2005) and gender disparities in salary compensation (Belliveau 2005).  
Specifically, we find that male students with more experience and students with higher 
GMAT verbal scores are more averse to congestion. This seems paradoxical given 
these are stronger students on some dimensions (work experience and GMAT scores), 
and their job search prospects should be less hurt by congestion. One interpretation of 
this finding is that these stronger students are willing to apply to less popular (and 
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perhaps non-traditional) internships, relative to the students who have less work 
experience and lower scores.  
  
Table 5  Interaction Effects of Student Demographics with Social Influence 
 
Variable Mean Std. Error Pr(t>|t|) 
Intercept 0.256 0.175  
Gender -0.110 0.040 *** 
International -0.010 0.043  
Experience -0.012 0.007 * 
GMAT V -0.007 0.004 * 
GMAT Q -0.003 0.004  
GMAT AWA 0.018 0.025  
GPA 0.051 0.060  
1.5.4 Counterfactual Analysis and Policy Implication 
 We discuss next the policy implications of our results for recruiting employers 
and the career officers in a business school.  The main policy instrument for an 
employer is salary.  So we focus on the impact of salary in the presence of social 
effects.  For this analysis we repeat the simulation in section 1.3.2.  To simplify our 
illustration, we consider a group of homogeneous students, each of whom is identical 
to representative student *i .  Further, we focus on only one of the internship attributes 
– salary; similar insights hold for other internship attributes viewed positively by 
students. We compute the choice probability of the representative student as a function 
of salary while fixing the social effects parameter γ  at one of three values: negative (-
0.403), zero, or positive (0.403). Note that the estimated value of γ  in our data for 
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*i is -0.403. Also, the positive value of 0.403 leads to a unique equilibrium choice 
probability (larger positive values may lead to multiple equilibria; we do not consider 
those cases here). In  
Figure 2 we show the three choice probability functions corresponding to the three 
values of the social effects parameter.  
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Figure 2   Impact of Salary Under Negative, Zero, and Positive Social Effects 
We make the following observations from Figure 2. First, for all three curves, 
the choice probability is (strictly) increasing in salary.  This implies that attractive 
internship characteristics increase choice probability regardless of the existence or 
sign of social effects.  Second, for each level of salary, the choice probability is strictly 
increasing in social effects. Thus, negative social effects reduce the choice probability.  
However, when the salary is low, the internship is unattractive. Therefore, there are 
few applicants, leading to low congestion.  Consequently, at low salaries the choice 
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probability with negative social effects is close to that without social effects.  The 
largest differences in choice probabilities between the three curves appear in the 
middle range of the salary.  At high salaries, the choice probabilities become close 
again. This implies that the salary effects will eventually dominate social effects 
because the social utility component 
*iPγ  is bounded above byγ .   
A third insight from figure 2 is that  to achieve a given probability of being 
chosen, the salary that a prospective employer needs to offer to the representative 
student *i is lower in the presence of positive social effects when compared to a 
situation of no social effects, and higher with negative social effects.  As expected, 
positive social effects help an employer to recruit. Fourth, we observe that the 
marginal effect of salary on the choice probability (the slopes of the curves) varies 
between the three cases. Specifically, when salary is low (high), the marginal effects 
of salary with positive social effects are higher (lower) than those with negative social 
effects.  This knowledge is useful for employers to predict the impact of a change in 
salary offered on the likelihood of their receiving an internship application. Finally, 
for a fixed choice probability, the marginal effect of salary is increasing in social 
effects.   
These observations suggest the following implications for employers. It is 
obvious that an employer can positively influence the number of internship 
applications by making attributes such as salary more attractive. An alternative 
approach is to reduce student concerns about being crowded out, e.g. by directly 
communicating with the students most prone to negative social effects (in our case 
students who are male, and have higher work experience and higher verbal GMAT 
scores).   
The next proposition formalizes these observations. 
Proposition 1.2: Let ( , )s ∈ −∞ ∞ denote salary, and ( | )sσ γ denote the choice 
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probability as a function of the salary for *γ γ< , where *γ is the threshold for 
multiple equilibria. The equilibrium choice probability is implicitly defined by 
 
( | )( | ) ( |
exp( )
1 e p( ))x
s s
s
s s
β γσ γ
σ γ β γσ γ
+
=
+ +
 (25) 
Then 
a) ( | )sσ γ is a cumulative distribution function of s given parameters γ and β  
b) If 1 2s s< , then 1 2( ) ( ),  for | all *|s sσ γ σ γ γ γ< <   
c) If 1 2 *γ γ γ< < , then 1 2( ) ( ),  for all | |s s sσ γ σ γ< , i.e. 1( | )sσ γ first-order 
stochastic dominates 2( | )sσ γ  
d) If 1 2 *γ γ γ< < , 1 2( ) ( )| |sd sds sσ γ σ γ<∫ ∫  
e) Suppose 1 2 *γ γ γ< < . There exist open sets 1B and 2B such that, 1 2sup infB B< , 
and 21( | ) / ( | ) /d s ds d s dsσ γ σ γ<  for 1s B∈ , and 
21( | ) / ( | ) /d s ds d s dsσ γ σ γ> for 2s B∈ . 
f) Suppose 1 2 *γ γ γ< < . For a fixed 1 1 2 2( | ) ( | )s sσ γ σ γ= , 
21 1 2( | ) / ( | ) /d s ds d s dsσ γ σ γ<  
See Appendix A for a proof. 
1.6  Conclusion 
We have modeled choice decisions in the presence of endogenous positive or 
negative social effects. We estimate that negative social effects exist in MBA students’ 
internship choices.  The model we propose is general enough to be applicable to other 
decision contexts in a large group where members interact with all other members and 
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where members are likely to have private information.  
As we have shown, there is a unique equilibrium for the negative social effects 
found in our case.  When positive social effects exist and are sufficiently large, 
researchers may need to address identification issues caused by multiple equilibria. An 
important challenge that we do not address is the development of methods to test 
multiplicity of equilibria, similar to the one proposed in Echenique and Komunjer 
(forthcoming). Another question to be addressed in future research is that of modeling 
endogenous group formation. Given our context we were able to assume that all 
students in a relatively small MBA cohort are members of the group. One approach is 
to model a group member’s decision as a two-stage process (Zanella 2007).  In the 
first stage, an individual decides whether to join a group.  In the second stage, she 
makes a decision given her group membership.  Zanella (2007) shows the two-stage 
process can potentially be represented by a nested logit model.  Our model can be seen 
as the second stage of such a two-stage model, with the group membership taken as 
given.   
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Chapter 2  An Equilibrium Analysis of Online Social Content-
sharing Websites 
2.1  Introduction 
 User generated content is an emerging online phenomenon.  Individuals are no 
longer audiences of traditional media industry. Hundreds of web sites allow ordinary 
people to create and share diverse kinds of content including videos (YouTube), 
photographs (Flickr), research papers (CiteULike), online bookmarks (del.icio.us), 
presentations (slideshare), documents (Scribd), Citizen journalism (Slashdot), 
Encyclopedia (Wikipedia), food (All recipes), and fashion (Polyvore).  Each website 
hosts a large ecosystem.  Forty four million visitors worldwide used Yahoo Flickr in 
March 2008, and over twenty six million users have contributed four billion 
photographs since the site’s inception (Graham 2008, Champ 2009).   
 Firms recognize business potential of aforementioned content.  Yahoo paid an 
estimated 40 million dollars for Flickr in 2005, and Google paid an estimated 1.6 
billion dollars for YouTube in 2006.  But it is not all that clear how to manage a 
content system because content differs from traditional goods.  Content is free. 
Content consumers do not pay to consume, nor do content producers make profit in 
production.  So YouTube and Flickr need to adopt business policies different from 
ones for traditional goods.  The starting point for policy analysis is to understand who 
a content firm is.  A content firm plays at least three roles: (1) a Web2.0 firm, (2) a 
central planner for consumer welfare, and (3) a profit seeker.  First, YouTube and 
Flickr are built upon Web2.0 technology.  A primary objective of Web2.0 is to 
encourage user participation and to transform users from content consumers to 
producers (Oreilly 2007).  Second, content website providers are hosts and guardians 
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of social activities involving millions of users.  Firm’s own business ethics, such as 
Google’s “Do no evil” code of conduct, call for consideration of consumer welfare.  In 
addition, Firms like Google and Yahoo face constant scrutiny from lawmakers 
(Hausman and Sidak 2009).  Finally, content firms are profit maximizers.  Monetizing 
content is an ongoing quest.  One profit opportunity is to charge content producers.  
Yahoo Flickr, for example, sells storage space for photo producers.   
 This paper provides a modeling framework to analyze policy options.  The 
aforementioned objectives all involve individual content users:  Web2.0 and profit 
objectives are concerned with producer, and consumer welfare objective is concerned 
with consumer.  So we first model consumer and producer behaviors.  Content is 
differentiated in quality, and is ranked from low to high by a number.  We assume that 
a consumer is only satisfied by content above a threshold quality.  Therefore lower 
quality is an imperfect substitute for high quality (Rosen 1981).  Consumers need to 
search for satisfactory quality.  Since the number of consumers is large, each of them 
has no influence on the whole system and can only take sampling probability—
probability to find a particular quality  as given.    A utility maximizing consumer 
takes sampling probability as input to decide optimal demand.  On supply side, 
producers no longer make profits because content is free.  Content systems allow 
consumers to leave positive feedback on a piece of content if they are satisfied by the 
quality (we call this endorsement).  We assume  producers are motivated by 
endorsement.  Since the number of producers is large, producers take endorsement as 
given.   Producers take endorsement as input to decide optimal production. 
 Sampling probability is a key policy instrument for content firms (Bernardo 
and Wu 2007).6 But before policy intervention, an understanding of origin of sampling 
                                                 
6
 Only sampling probability is considered to be a policy instrument in this paper, while manipulation of 
endorsement will be considered an internet fraud.  Policy makers can use the framework in this paper to 
analyze consequence of fraudulent manipulation of endorsement.  
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probability and endorsement is required.  They are exogenous variables in the 
individual models, but to content firms yet to intervene, both variables are created 
within the system or endogenous.  The individual models alone do not explain genesis 
and persistence of sampling probability and endorsement.  Yet both are central to 
policy issues.  The importance of sampling probability can be argued from attention 
economics (Pieters 1999, Dukas 2004).  In a seminar paper (Simon 1971), Herbert 
Simon makes a general observation that we live in a world in which information is 
abundant whereas attention is scarce.  Content can be considered as one form of 
information.  Sampling probability informs us about which content will get limited 
attention.  Herbert Simon is concerned with organization design in an information rich 
world, and he argues that an information processing subsystem “can transform 
(‘filter’) information into an output that demands fewer hours of attention than the 
input information.”  Recently computer scientists start to implement this goal by 
designing policies to allocate scarce attention to rich information (Bernardo and Wu 
2007).  We will show a content system without a centralized force overseeing entire 
system, possesses an ability to filter information. Attention is a consumer objective.  
We will show sampling probability is also important to achieving content website 
objectives. 
 It is also important to study endorsement because interesting pattern emerges 
on endorsement and resulting production.  We collect a sample of about 40 million 
photographs taken by about 205,000 users from Yahoo Flickr (see Table 6 for a 
summary statistics).  We plot number of users against maximum endorsement per 
photo in Figure 3.  The plot shows that a small number of producers enjoy a large per 
photo endorsement.  Pattern also emerges in content production.  We plot number of 
users against number of photo produced by a user in Figure 4.  The plot shows that a 
small number of producers produce a large number of photos.  Perhaps the most 
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striking fact is that production inequality has been observed across different types of 
content, and sometimes characterized as 1-9-90 rule, i.e., an empirical observation that 
heavy producer, light producer, and lurkers take up 1%, 9%, and 90% population 
respectively (Nonnecke and Preece 2000). Understanding production inequality is 
relevant to firm objectives. Inequality suggests that a primary objective of Web2.0 
firms— democratizing content generation by promoting individual participation and 
content diversity—may have failed.  Furthermore, firms build their business models 
on the premise that majority of users will produce in an equal fashion.  One such 
company, Splashcast, folded its operation in 2009 after its CEO made the following 
remark: “Most of us would rather consume than create. This is one of the big ticket 
findings of the Web 2.0 technology wave” (Schonfeld 2009). 
 
 
Figure 3   Inequality in Production (X-axis shows number of photos, and y-axis shows 
number of producers. Both are in log scale). 
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Figure 4   Inequality in Production (X-axis shows number of photos, and y-axis shows 
number of producers. Both are in log scale). 
 
Table 6   Summary Statistics 
variable mean range 
Number of endorsements per producer 59.07 0 - 53,659 
Number of photos per producer 189.8 1-115,770 
Number of endorsements per photo 9.24 0 - 6127 
Sampling probability in current period 2.46e-8 0 – 2.57e-3 
Sampling probability in previous period 2.67e-8 0 – 8.08e-4 
Photo quality score 1.08411e-06 4.68252e-10 – 1.06115e-3 
 
 The main part of this paper studies how optimal consumer behavior and 
optimal producer behavior interact to give rise to endogenous sampling probability 
and endorsement.  We frame the managerial questions to a problem of studying 
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whether a content system can reach equilibrium—a state in which interacting users 
will not change their behaviors.  A useful parallel to guide our study of content system 
is market for traditional goods.  The market mechanism is well known: myopic 
individuals make decentralized decisions, yet the system can reach equilibrium in 
which no individual wants to change his/her decision.  The individuals need not know 
the decisions of others as long as they know prices of goods.  So a fundamental role of 
price is to enable a decentralized market to function. The celebrated general 
equilibrium theory shows that equilibrium prices exist (Arrow and Debreu 1954, 
Debreu 1959).  However, two features of user generated content prevent application of 
the market mechanism: content is free, and content is non-rival, i.e., one individual’s 
consumption of a piece of content does not reduce the amount that another can 
consume. Since content is free, price as the sufficient statistic for decentralized 
decision-making is missing. Market equilibrium is defined as a state of balance—
market clearing, i.e., demand meets supply.  But market clearing is not relevant for 
content due to its non-rival feature.  To fill the missing content mechanism, we 
develop and characterize a content equilibrium from first principles.    
 First, we demonstrate that a decentralized content system may reach 
equilibrium under two conditions: (1) a user makes independent decisions between 
content consumption and production, and (2) quantity demand varies inversely with 
search cost.  A content equilibrium has the following features.  The first feature is the 
information for decentralized decision making. In a market, consumers and producers 
use the same information, i.e., price.  In a content system, consumers and producers 
use different information, i.e., search cost and endorsement.  We show that search cost 
and endorsement are related.  The second feature is the relationship between demand 
and supply. In a market, total demand equals total supply. In a content system, the role 
of market clearing is replaced by endorsement clearing, i.e., the total endorsements 
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given by the consumers equals the total endorsements received by the producers.   
These two features highlight the significance of endorsement.  Endorsement not only 
provides feedback to individual producers, but also enables a decentralized system to 
reach equilibrium.  The third feature is where regularity appears at equilibrium. At a 
content equilibrium, regularity lies in the distribution of content, i.e., the relative 
amounts of different content in a system. It explains empirical regularity across 
content platforms is observed on distribution such as 1-9-90 rule rather than absolute 
measures.  The fourth feature is equilibrium outcome. The system outcome only 
depends on the demand side condition.  This result is complementary to the one-sided 
equilibrium in which the market outcome only depends on the supply side, as shown 
by Paul Samuelson in his Non-substitution Theorem (Samuelson 1951).  The fifth 
feature is optimality. Inequality seems to suggest that a content system is like an 
oligopoly market, and bad for consumer welfare.  We show the contrary.  The sixth 
feature is self-organization. We demonstrate that a content system can steer itself 
towards the equilibrium without any exogenous forces.  Such force is significant 
because a content system is fundamentally decentralized.  In social network literature, 
researchers have discovered a remarkable small world phenomenon—short paths exist 
between individuals (Milgram 1967).  Even more remarkably, Jon Kleinberg shows 
why these short paths can be found by individuals with no global knowledge except 
their immediate neighbors (Kleinberg 2000). This paper established a similar type of 
collective intelligence—a content system not only has a good state (Pareto optimal 
equilibrium), but also knows how to find it from many other perhaps sub-optimal 
states.  
 Second, we show inequality arises in a content equilibrium.  High quality 
producers will always earn more endorsements and produce more content than low 
quality producers. The behavioral drive is imperfect substitution.  But it is the non-
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rival feature of content systems (a result of technology) that puts the behavior to work 
towards the advantage of high quality content.  High quality content can be consumed 
by consumers with taste for high quality, and earn their endorsements.  In the 
meantime, the same content can also be consumed by consumers with taste for low 
quality, and therefore compete for a share of endorsements for low quality content. 
Imperfect substitution prevents the reverse process—low quality producers cannot 
earn endorsements from high quality taste consumers. The selective nature of the 
content equilibrium helps achieve the organization design goal in Simon (1971). If the 
content system fails to deliver a democratic web, it succeeds in providing collaborative 
filtering – a mechanism that makes high quality content easier to find, and that 
promotes the production of high quality content.   It is also worth noting that producer 
quality decides inequalities in endorsement, production, and sampling probability only 
in a qualitative way.  Size of the inequalities is independent from quality difference 
between low and high quality producers.  This is a result from the fact that equilibrium 
is independent from supply side condition.  The disconnection between reward and 
talent has been observed in labor market (Lazearand and Rosen 1981).   
 We use our basic model to characterize other forces on the inequality. The first 
force is incomplete endorsement. Our basic model assumes that consumers will 
endorse when their demand is met (which we call complete endorsement).  In reality, 
consumers may not always endorse a piece of content even when it satisfies their 
demand (which we call incomplete endorsement).  This is a problem similar to survey 
non-response.  We show that if consumers want their preferred content, they should 
endorse.  The second force is search by endorsement. We show that endorsement may 
give extra advantage to high quality content over time.  In the basic model, high 
quality content producers have an advantage because they can earn endorsements from 
consumers who look for low quality content.  The basic model assumes that content 
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has uniform sampling probability—the probability that a piece of content is found by 
consumers.   However, consumers may return to the same producers whom they 
endorse.  Therefore, endorsement can be prior information for locating content in the 
future.  Since the high quality producers have more endorsements, high quality content 
will be easier to find.  So the inequality will increase over time because the sampling 
probability is changing over time.  This is similar to the preferential attachment 
process (“rich-get-richer”) which can lead to a power law distribution—a highly 
skewed distribution (Newman 2005).  The third force is entry of new producers. We 
demonstrate that new producers entering the system counter-balance the skew towards 
high quality content for existing producers in short term.  New content producers of 
different qualities have equal production because they have not received any 
preferential endorsement.  So the addition of their content decreases the search cost of 
existing low quality content.  In long run, however, content system returns to 
equilibrium state in terms of sampling probability. 
 Third, we discuss how to extend our model to more general conditions. We 
extend our model from two qualities to multiple qualities. Multiple qualities account 
for finer differentiation among producers, and therefore explain why some high 
quality producers produce more than others.  When demand is nonlinear in inverse of 
search cost, our equilibrium model can be used to construct bounds for existing non-
linear demand specifications in the literature.  We also relax the independence 
assumption between a user’s consumption and production decisions.  Using the 
proposed framework, we provide policy recommendations to content platform 
providers.  Our analysis shows that sampling probability is a key policy instrument 
because it affects consumer demand.  A content site provider can decide which content 
appears more often than others, and therefore change sampling probability.  A website 
provider can also use sampling probability to influence producers given our insight to 
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interaction between consumer and producer.  Consumers always like content with 
higher qualities than their threshold ones.  So as a central planner, a site provider 
should promote high quality content.  However, Web2.0 objective of promoting 
individual participation / content diversity implies that sampling probabilities should 
not be concentrated on a small set of content.  A compromise will be to promote 
existing content according to quality ranking.  Content websites make profit from 
selling services to content producers.  Sampling probability influences consumer 
decision on endorsement, and therefore indirectly influences producer decision.  
Producers are more likely to purchase services when they produce more.  An efficient 
policy appears to be assigning sampling probability to high quality content because the 
resulting endorsement is not split between high and low quality producers.  However, 
high quality content is more than low quality one at equilibrium.  So in terms of unit 
endorsement, it makes no difference whether to promote high or low quality content.  
The optimal policy is to promote existing content in an equal fashion.   Therefore, a 
central planner and a diversity promoter are competing roles.  Interestingly, promoting 
diversity and making profits can be consistent.  
 Our model provides three additional managerial implications.  First, content 
equilibrium allows us to define relative economic value of content.  The economic 
value of goods is captured by price (Debreu 1959).  For content without price, 
endorsement captures the value of content.  As the value of goods is determined by 
interaction between consumers and producers of goods, the value of content is 
determined by interaction between consumers and producers of content.  Second, our 
analysis provides a first benchmark of content consumer welfare for policy makers 
who potentially need to regulate content systems.  Third, since search cost and 
endorsement are endogenous, researchers and firms need to consider simultaneity 
issue when they conduct empirical analysis to estimate content consumer and producer 
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behaviors.    
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After discussing related literature 
in Section 2.2, we describe a basic model of content equilibrium in Section 2.3.  We 
use the basic model to study inequality in Section 2.4. We introduce various 
extensions of the basic model in Section 2.5.  We investigate how to use our 
framework to manage content websites in Section 2.6, and conclude in Section 2.7.   
2.2  Related Literature 
 User generated content is an emerging phenomenon, so we use its features as 
the starting point of comparison with the extant literature.  Content is like public goods 
in that it exhibits non-rival feature (although unlike content, public goods have prices).  
The public goods literature (Bergstrom et al. 1986) focuses on the provision issue of 
public goods.  Researchers find that private provision of public goods is inefficient 
when compared to a competitive market due to the free-riding problem. Free-riding is 
not an issue here because the cost of giving an endorsement (clicking a mouse button) 
is negligible, and because the large number of users in a content system prevents any 
single user from changing the system. We show that a content system can be efficient 
despite the non-rival feature.   
 Content is an online phenomenon. The large body of click stream literature 
(Bucklin et al. 2002) focuses on consumer choice behavior on the internet, while our 
study focuses on the system behavior of consumers and producers.  We make certain 
abstractions in consumer behavior in order to focus on system dynamics.  Further 
extensions to our model can be made by adding richer consumer behavior found in the 
click stream literature. Different from goods in the click stream literature, content is 
free and non-rival.   
 The two-sided market literature (Rochet and Tirole 2006) includes diverse off-
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line examples such as credit card and video consoles.  The unifying theme is that the 
platform provider adopts a pricing strategy that uses one side to subsidize the other.  
Subsidization takes place in online content-sharing websites.  For example, it is free to 
view a photo on Flickr.  However, the goods in the two-sided market literature all have 
prices, and one side gets a monetary reward.  In comparison, user-generated content is 
free, and the producer does not receive any monetary reward.  So before we can study 
a pricing strategy for content site providers, we need to fill the gap on how the two 
sides interact on free content.  In addition, the literature does not address why 
inequality arises across online content systems.   
 There is a growing stream of literature on a type of user generated content—
user review, e.g. book and DVD reviews on Amazon (Chevalier and Mazlin 2006, 
Ghose and Ipeirotis 2008, Archak et al. 2008, and Lee and Bradlow 2009).  The type 
of content in this paper differs from user reviews in that they are the primary subjects 
to consume whereas user reviews are used to facilitate consumption of other products.  
Consumers purchase books and DVD’s produced by publishing companies.  User 
review serves as a medium for users to exchanging product and consumption 
information.  Photos on Flickr and videos on YouTube are end consumption subjects 
like books and DVD’s rather than their reviews.  But unlike books and DVD’s, photos 
and videos are free.  Market is the underpinning for studying user reviews. Our paper 
provides a system mechanism for content as primary consumption subjects.  Two 
papers studying content as primary subjects are Ghose and Han (2009) and Kumar 
(2009), both of which study dynamic user behavior.  Ghose and Han (2009) study 
learning behavior due to uncertainty in content quality. Our paper differs from their 
single agent model framework, and studies the interaction of agents in an entire 
system. As we mention in future research, our model can be extended by including 
learning behavior.  Kumar (2009) and our paper are complementary in terms of the 
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type of content in question.  He studies the content available only to one’s friends and 
peers whereas we study the content available to general public.  Kumar studies the 
competitive interaction among friends and peers assuming the competition will reach 
Markov Perfect Equilibrium.  Our paper assumes only myopic rather than strategic 
behavior, and proposes a content equilibrium in which the general population 
interacts.   
 Inequality has been studied in a variety of contexts by sociologists and 
computer scientists.  The striking feature they find is that the inequality follows a 
precise form, namely the power law (Simon 1955) and other related distributions.  
Sociologists and computer scientists have proposed various generative models for the 
power law (Newman 2005).  These models typically lack micro foundation.  Rosen 
(1981) studies a looser form of inequality—convexity.  Rosen studies what he terms 
the superstar phenomenon, the observation that a small fraction of participants tend to 
dominate a field, earning the majority of the money. A few highly-paid athletes 
dominate a sport, for example. Rosen attributes the superstar phenomenon to two 
micro foundations.  First, consumers prefer high quality, and therefore lower quality is 
an imperfect substitute for high quality.  Second, technology enables a producer to 
serve a large market share without incurring proportional cost.  Imperfect substitution 
applies to content because content is differentiated in quality.  And it was Rosen’s 
extraordinary vision on technology that makes his work particularly relevant to 
content. Rosen writes: “The practical importance of all this is related to technical 
changes that have increased the extent of scale economies over time in many 
activities.  Motion pictures, radio, television, photo reproduction equipment, and other 
changes in communications have decreased the real price of entertainment services, 
but have also increased the scope of each performer’s audience.”   The Internet pushes 
Rosen’s vision to an extreme in which (1) content is free and (2) a content producer 
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can now reach almost any Internet user on Earth.  But Rosen shows that imperfect 
substitution and technology lead to a superstar phenomenon through a market process 
which is lacking in content systems.  In this paper, we provide the first analysis to 
shed light on a content process and how it generates inequality starting from Rosen’s 
micro foundations.  Compared to the convexity in Rosen (1981), we study a more 
general form of inequality in the basic model, i.e., higher quality producer produces 
more than lower quality producer.  Then in an extension we discuss how preferential 
attachment—a process leading to a power law effect—may arise.  An alternative 
micro foundation for inequality is proposed in Adler (1985).  Adler suggests that an 
opera patron needs to learn about opera in order to better appreciate it.  It is easier for 
the patron to gain knowledge if an opera singer has a large fan base. Inequality will 
thus arise even if there is no difference in quality depending on the initial random fan 
base. Our paper uses Rosen’s micro foundation but a different system process. 
 Existence of content equilibrium is a question similar to the existence of 
competitive equilibrium in the competitive market literature.  Our goal is not to 
achieve the generality of the analysis in Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959) 
among others, but to provide a simple model to show the possibility of content 
equilibria.  In contrast to competitive markets which are enabled solely by price, we 
show that content consumers and producers use two different sources of information: 
search cost and endorsement.  The structure of content systems makes the two related.  
We also show that, since content does not clear as goods do, we need the balance of 
endorsement to unite the two sides of a content system.  The specific nature of our 
model allows us to show that regularity lies in the distribution of production.  A static 
method (fixed-point theorem) is used to establish competitive equilibrium, whereas we 
construct a novel Liapnov function which shows not only the existence of equilibrium 
but also how a content system can get there.  Our approach is in the same spirit as the 
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Tâtonnement process used to establish stability of a competitive market (Arrow and 
Hahn 1971).  The significance of the Tâtonnement process is that it demonstrates an 
optimal state of economy can be reached in a decentralized fashion.   
2.3  Basic Model of Content Equilibrium 
 We start with a discussion of content features and individual behaviors in 
Section 2.3.1.  Then we detail content user behaviors and their interaction without 
assuming equilibrium in Section 2.3.2.  We demonstrate content equilibrium in 
Section 2.3.3.  
2.3.1 Content and Individual 
 We have mentioned two features of content: free and non-rival. Content is also 
differentiated. Like differentiated goods, each piece of content is unique in dimensions 
specific to the type of content.  For example, nearly every one of the over 4 billion 
photographs on Flickr is unique in subjects, compositions, exposure settings, etc.  We 
follow Rosen (1981) and assume that the differences can be summarized by one 
number referred to as quality z (see Table 7 for a key to notation).  Rosen uses a 
continuous quality (0, )z ∈ ∞ , while we use a discrete version { , 1,..., }iz z i I= =
 
where 
I is potentially enormous, but still finite, and 1 ... Iz z< < .  This can be motivated by 
having quality on a continuum 1( , )Iz z .  Since users may not be able to distinguish tiny 
difference in quality, we can divide the continuum into a finite number of intervals, 
and iz is the average quality in an interval.  
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Table 7   Notation and Variable Explanation 
 
{1,..., }i I∈  content quality index 
iz  Threshold content quality of type i consumer 
p
iz
 
Content quality by type i producer 
( )ix t  quantity demanded for quality iz  during period t  
iα  exogenous preference parameter by consumer with threshold quality iz  
iW  budget for consumer with threshold quality iz  
( )iox t  demand for outside good by consumer with threshold quality iz  
op
 
price for the outside good 
ox  total endowment of outside good 
( )ip t  search cost for quality iz  
w  wage rate for all consumers 
( )is t  quantity of content that consumer must examine before finding content 
of quality iz
 
or higher 
τ  time required to examine one piece of content 
( )iF z  cumulative distribution function for quality iz  
( )im t  sampling probability - the probability that content selected at random has 
quality iz  
iu
 
utility for consumer with threshold quality iz  
iu
 
a pre-determined level of utility for consumer with threshold quality iz  
( )iY t
 
total number of content of quality iz  at the end of period t  
( )iy t
 
content production of quality iz  during period t  
( )ie t
 
total number of endorsement for quality iz  generated during period t  
( )ie t∆
 
endorsement increase per existing content  of quality iz during period t 
( )iE t
 
endorsement per exiting content of quality iz  during period t  
ψ
 
monetary value per endorsement 
il
 
labor (in terms of time) needed to produce each content iz  
iq
 
time budget to consume content iz and outside good 
iT
 
Total time budget for production and consumption 
iβ
 
percentages of the demand that translate into endorsements for consumer 
with threshold quality iz  
Y∆
 
number of new content  by new producers added at each quality level 
η
 
shape parameter in Hendel and Dube model 
θ
 
shape parameter for non-linear demand 
c
 
fixed cost to adjust sampling probability by content site provider 
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Table 7 Continued 
iλ  penalizing/regularizing parameter for central planner 
iγ  penalizing/regularizing parameter for profit maximizer 
B
 
normalizing constant for purchasing probability 
K
 
constant defined as 2\2K wψ τ=  
sp  price for the service provided by content site provider 
n
 
number of consumer and number of producer in stochastic specification 
a
 
probability consumers access content by new producers 
 
We also identify the key properties of content systems. First, in Rosen’s analysis, 
one requirement for the superstar phenomenon is direct contact between consumers 
and producers.  Such direct contact is even stronger in a content system, since most 
sharing sites allow either party to learn the identity of the other, and even to 
communicate with them.  Second, a large number of content consumers and producers 
are involved.  Third, most content systems have endorsement features, allowing 
consumers to give feedback to producers about their content.  For instance, YouTube 
viewers give 1- to 5-star ratings to videos, while Flickr allows a consumer to mark a 
photo as her favorite.  
Users in content-sharing websites consume multiple pieces of content, analogous 
in marketing to a situation in which consumers consume multiple quantities of 
products in multiple categories.  The consumers make decisions about which and how 
much content to view.  In our context, we assume that consumers decide what to view 
based on quality. Each consumer is endowed with an exogenous threshold quality at a 
given time, assumed to result from one’s upbringing, education, values, and other 
factors. Any content at the threshold quality or above can meet the consumer’s 
demand.  As mentioned before, the vast majority of content producers do not make 
profits on their work.  Since the motivation is not financial profit, we assume that 
producers are motivated by gaining endorsements, in a similar way that scholars are 
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motivated by gaining recognition of their scientific work (Merton 1957).  We make 
the following assumptions on individuals.  
Assumptions (individual behavior)  
1. Consumers prefer higher quality to lower quality.  In this context, for a consumer 
endowed with a certain quality preference, he also accepts content of any higher 
quality. 
2. Consumers have search costs when they allocate their time in consuming content. 
3. The cost to endorse is negligible. 
4. Content producers are motivated by endorsement from consumers. 
2.3.2 Individual Behavior and System Dynamic  
 We use a simple model to describe the essence of a content equilibrium.  For 
the moment we make three simplifying assumptions: (1)  there are only two quality 
scores, 1 2z z< ; (2)  there are two consumers 1, 2i = , those who have threshold quality 
at 1z  and those who have threshold quality at  2z ; and (3) there are exactly two 
producers, one producing content with quality 1 1 2, )[p zz z∈  and the other 
2 2 ,[ )p zz ∈ ∞ , where 1 pz  and 2 pz denote product qualities.7  Note that type 1 
consumer likes content produced by both producers whereas type 2 consumer only 
prefer content of quality 2
pz .  Each of the two consumers can be considered an 
aggregation of many identical consumers.  Similarly, each of the two producers can be 
considered an aggregation of many identical producers.  It is possible that some of the 
users are both consumers and producers.  For the moment, we assume that 
consumption and production decisions are independent.  We begin our analysis by 
describing system dynamics, without assuming that it is in equilibrium.   
                                                 
7
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this flexible specification which admits the following 
specification: 1 1 22,  .
ppz z z z= =  
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 Let 1 2( ), ( )x t x t  denote the demand by the two consumers during a period of 
time t.  Let 1 2,α α  denote exogenous preference for content by the two consumers, 
respectively.  Both consumers have a fixed budget 1W and 2W .  A consumer i decides 
between content ( )ix t and a composite good ( )ox t  (we use 1 2 and o ox x to denote the 
demand of the two consumers for the composite good).  The search cost denoted 
by ( ), 1,2ip t i = , is paid by the consumer in order to find a piece of content that 
satisfies his or her preferences.  We assume that search process is sampling with 
replacement since the amount of content is large.8  Of course, the actual search on 
content-sharing sites is free, but consumer still pays with lost time (with which he or 
she could be earning money). In particular, we model the consumer’s cost as 
( ) ( )i ip t w s tτ= , where w  is the consumer’s wage rate (we assume equal wage for 
simplicity), ( )is t  is the quantity of content that the consumer must examine before 
finding a piece of content of quality iz
 
or higher, and τ  is the average time required to 
examine one piece of content. Let ( )iF z denote the cumulative probability distribution 
function, so that ( )iF z  indicates the probability that a given piece of content has a 
quality less than iz . Then for an individual seeking quality iz  or above, the probability 
he is satisfied is 1 ( )iF z− because any quality higher than iz will be satisfactory.  Thus 
the probability of a consumer being satisfied for the first time with the n-th photo 
follows a geometric distribution 1(1 ( )) ( )ni iF z F z −− , and the expected number of 
photos he needs to sample in order to find a photo of quality iz  or higher is 
1/ (1 ( ))i is F z= − .  In our context there are exactly two discrete quality values. Let 
( ), 1,2im t i =  denote the sampling probabilities for the low and high quality content—
the probability that content selected at random has quality iz .  Then the expected 
number of steps to find a quality at least as good as iz is:   
                                                 
8
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this clarification. 
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 1 2
1 2 2
1 1( ) 1,  ( ) .( ) ( ) ( )s t s tm t m t m t= = =+  (26) 
Note that it takes only one step for a consumer looking for low quality, because any 
content will suffice. Let 1u and 2u denote utilities for the two consumers.  Supposing 
that consumers have a quasilinear utility function, they have the following 
maximization problem:   
 
( ), ( )
max ln ( ) ( )
s.t.   ( ) ( ) ( ) ,   1,2.
it xi o tx
i
i o
i
o
i
i i i
x t x t
p t x t x t W i
α +
+ = =
 (27) 
The optimal values of demand are inversely proportional to the search cost:  
 1 2
1 2
1 1 2 2
2( ) ,  ( ) ( ).( ) ( )x t x t m tp t w p t w
α α α α
τ τ
= = = =     (28) 
The demand for high quality increases with its sampling probability because higher 
sampling probability makes it easier to find content. Next we make the link between 
sampling probability and production.  We consider the simplest case in which each 
piece of content has an equal probability of being sampled.  Let 1 2( ), ( )Y t Y t  denote the 
total number of pieces of content produced at the end of time period t in the system 
having low and high qualities, respectively.  The sampling probability at period t is a 
function of total production output at the end of previous period 1t − : 
 
2
1 2
21 1
21( 1) ( 1)( ) ,  ( ) .( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
Y t Y t
m t m t
Y t Y t Y t Y t
− −
= =
− + − − + −
 (29) 
In the basic model, we assume that consumers will endorse whenever their demand is 
met.  This is the link between consumer choices and producer incentives.  Let 
1 2( ), ( )e t e t  denote the total number of endorsements attracted by low quality content 
and high quality content during time period t: 
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1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 2
1 2 1 2 2
22 1 2 2 2
1 2
( 1)( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,( 1) ( 1)
( 1)( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .( 1) ( 1)
( )
Y t
e t x t m t m t
w w Y t Y t
Y t
e t x t m t x t m t m t
w w w Y t Y t
α α
τ τ
α α α α
τ τ τ
−
= = =
− + −
+ −
= + = + =
− + −
 (30) 
The key point is that the demand for low quality will be shared by high quality 
because of the imperfect substitution and non-rival properties.  
  We have so far discussed the relationship between consumer behavior and 
period endorsement.  Sampling and endorsement distribution processes are stochastic.  
We can derive the endorsement distribution in Eq. (30) from alternative stochastic 
specifications and law of large numbers.  Suppose that each type of consumer has 
n members, and let 1 jx and 2 jx  where 1,...,j n= denote the demands for low and high 
quality consumers.  Suppose that high quality consumers know about the sampling 
probability 2m up to an error, i.e., 2 jm , and 2 2( )jE m m= .  Consider an experiment 
with n samples, each of which has a pair of low and high consumers.  Then the period 
endorsement from each sample are random variables denoted by 1 ( )je t  and 2 je : 
 
1
1
1
1
1
2 2
( ) ( ),
( ) (1 ( )) ( ).
j
j
x
l
l
x
l
l
j
j j
e t d t
e t d t x t
=
=
=
= − +
∑
∑
 (31) 
where ( )ld t denote an indicator function such that ( ) 1ld t = if a demand of low quality 
consumer is given to a low quality content, and ( ) 0ld t = otherwise.  From Eq. (28), 
we have 11 22 2( ) / ( ),  ( ) ( ) / ( ).j j jx t w x t m t wα τ α τ= =  We assume that sampling process 
and whether particular demand of a low quality consumer is satisfied by a low quality 
content are independent.  Then the expected period endorsements from each sample 
are 
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1
1 1
1 2
2 1 2
( ( )) ,  
( ( )) ( ).
j
j
E e t m
w
E e t m m t
w w
α
τ
α α
τ τ
=
= +
 (32) 
Let 1 1 / ( )nx wα τ= and 2 2 / ( )nx wα τ= .  By Law of Large Number, Eq. (30) is an 
approximation of period endorsement when n is large.9    
 Next we examine period endorsement on each piece of content.  We can write 
the endorsement increase per unit existing content, denoted by 1 2,e e∆ ∆ during time 
period t for each quality as:  
 
2
2
2
1 1
1
1 1 2
1 2
1 2
( ) 1( ) ,( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( ) 1( ) .( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( )
e t
e t
Y t w Y t Y t
e t
e t
Y t w Y t Y t
α
τ
α α
τ
= =
− − + −
+
= =
− − + −
∆
∆
 (33) 
By taking the ratio of these two expressions and simplifying, we have: 
 
2 2
1 1
( ) 1 .( )
t
t
e
e
α
α
=
∆
+
∆
 (34) 
 Having described consumer behavior, we next specify producer behavior.  In 
content-sharing websites, producers observe endorsement from consumers.  For 
example, Yahoo Flickr shows the total number of endorsement each photo gets.  We 
assume that content producers are motivated by earning endorsement.  Endorsement is 
accumulated over time, and we define total per-unit endorsement 1 2( ), ( )E t E t  at 
period t  as   
 1 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( 1),  ( ) ( ) ( 1).e eE t t E t E t t E t+ − +≡ −∆ ≡ ∆  (35) 
Since producers generate new content at every period, older content receives more 
                                                 
9
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion of stochastic specification. 
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per-unit endorsement than newer content.  We assume that producers are motivated by 
the maximum per-unit endorsement.  So 1( )E t and 2( )E t are defined as cumulative per-
unit endorsement on the oldest content.  As we will show that the initial total unit 
endorsement (0)iE does not change the equilibrium, we only require (0) 0iE ≥ .   
 We consider a simple model of producer behavior.  Let 1 2( ), ( )y t y t denote the 
production for low and high quality content during period t . The current period’s 
production contributes to the total content available in the next period: 
 
( ) ( ) ( 1),  1,2.i iiY t y t Y t i= + − =  (36) 
Producing a piece of content does have a real monetary cost, because making content 
involves expending labor. We assume that a producer is able to compare the 
endorsement with his unit labor cost—wage rate w. Let ψ  denote this monetary value 
per unit of endorsement, and let il  denote labor needed to produce content.  To 
simplify the presentation, assume that the production technology is 1/2i iy l=  (we will 
show that our results do not depend on a particular specification of technology). Then 
the producer solves the following optimization problem: 
 
 
1
( )
/2
max ( ) ( ) ( )
s.t.  ( ) ( ) .
i i i i
i
y t
i
t y t wl t
y t l
E
t
ψ −
=
 (37) 
 We call the difference between the monetary value of endorsement and labor cost 
quasi-profit because motivation for producers is endorsement.  It is worth noting that 
current period endorsement ( )iE t is a function of previous period production ( )iy t .  
But since producers take endorsement as given, they do not perceive endorsement as a 
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function of production.10  An implicit assumption is that, producers use current period 
endorsement ( )iE t to predict next period endorsement ( 1)iE t + .  The consistency 
needed to justify this behavior is guaranteed in equilibrium as shown in Section 2.3.3.  
The optimal production to maximize quasi-profit is 
 
 
( )( ) .
2
i
i
E ty t
w
ψ
=
 (38) 
We have specified the behavior for both demand and supply sides.  Though we take a 
disequilibrium approach, we have introduced interaction between consumption and 
production.  Unlike in an equilibrium where individual no longer change behaviors, 
time matters in a disequilibrium environment, and we can order content system 
dynamics in the following sequence illustrated in Figure 5: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( 1)
consumer endorsement producer sampling
decision clearing decision
m t x t e t e t E t y t Y t m t→ → → ∆ → → → + → +
   
 
Figure 5  Content System Dynamics 
Sampling probability, demand, endorsement, and supply are all state variables in 
this chain of events, all of which are obviously related.   
2.3.3 Content Equilibrium  
 We have described consumer and producer behaviors without assuming the 
system is in equilibrium. Decisions are made based on exogenous data including 
                                                 
10
 Even if producers are forward looking, they cannot change endorsement due to large number of 
producers in content system.  Assuming myopic or forward-looking for producer behavior does not 
make a difference.    
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tastes, wealth, technology, and wage rate.  In addition, behaviors are hinged upon two 
endogenous variables—sampling probability and endorsement which are at center 
stage of policy issues.  The individual models with interaction in Section 2.3.2 have 
given their genesis: consumers hand out endorsement; and producers indirectly decide 
sampling probability through production.  However, the individual models are silent 
about their persistence as manifested in inequality phenomenon across content 
platforms.  The tool for studying persistence in social science is equilibrium analysis. 
In this section, we develop a content equilibrium from first principles.   
 First, we summarize the content system described in Section 2.3.2. 
Definition (User Generated Content system): A user generated content system 
(we use content system hereinafter) is a collection of individuals consuming and 
producing free and non-rival content through content-sharing websites.  Consumers 
take sampling probabilities as given and maximize utility.  Producers take 
endorsement as given and maximize quasi profits. Endorsement needs to clear, i.e., 
total endorsements received by producers equal total endorsement given by 
consumers.    
 Dictionary definition of equilibrium is “a state of balance between opposing 
forces or actions that is either static…or dynamic…” (Equilibrium 2010).  Market 
equilibrium is defined as a state in which goods consumers and producers have no 
incentive to change their behavior. We can define a similar content equilibrium. 
Definition (Content equilibrium 1): A content system is in equilibrium if content 
consumers and producers do not change their period decisions over time, i.e., 
( ) ( 1)i ix t x t= − and ( ) ( 1)i iy t y t= − for 1, 2i = . 
This definition does not immediately apply to our content system.  Content producers 
are motivated by accumulated per-unit endorsement 1( )E t and 2( )E t .  By definition in 
Eq. (35), 1( )E t and 2( )E t are non-decreasing over time.  Therefore, it is not clear 
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whether producers will reach steady decisions.  This is where content producers differ 
from traditional goods producers in addition to non-monetary nature of reward.  Goods 
producers are motivated by reward in a period, whereas content producers are 
motivated by cumulative reward over multiple periods.  This is caused how content 
websites present endorsement.  Content websites show cumulative endorsement rather 
than period endorsement, and therefore make the former as the sought-after reward for 
producers.  So we next define content equilibrium as a state in which consumers do 
not change their behaviors. This definition admits the first definition, but not vice 
versa.  We will show later that when time is large, producers will not change their 
behaviors in equilibrium.  
Definition (Content equilibrium 2): A content system is in equilibrium if content 
consumers do not change their demand over time, i.e., ( ) ( 1)i ix t x t= − for 1, 2i = . 
Content consumers make demand decisions based on exogenous tastes, income, time 
to examine one photo, and wage rate, i.e., a exogenous vector of , )( , ,i i wWα τ  for 
1, 2i = .  Demands are also functions of endogenous sampling probabilities im which in 
turn, are functions of total production iY for 1, 2i = .  If 1Y and 2Y no longer change, 
then demand will be stable.  Therefore, we can also define content equilibrium in 
terms of total production.  But first, we observe the fact that demands are independent 
from arbitrary scaling of total production 1Y and 2Y .    
Proposition 2.1 (Demand is homogeneous of degree zero in production): Demand 
depends on relative value of total production.  In another word, 
1 2 1 2( , ) ( , )i ix Y Y x Y Yα α= for any scalar 0α > . 
See Appendix B for a proof. 
This results implies that demands do not change if we normalize decision inputs 1Y and 
2Y by 1Y to 1 and 2 1/Y Y .  The intuition is that sampling probability is a relative value, 
so scaling total production does not change sampling probability.  Note that in market 
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environment, demand is independent from scaling of price. Using this fact, we give a 
second content equilibrium definition in terms of normalized total production.   
Definition (Content equilibrium 3): A user generated content system is in 
equilibrium if relative total production is constant over time, i.e., 
  
 
2 2
1 1
( ) ( 1)
.( ) ( 1)
Y t Y t
Y t Y t
−
=
−
 (39) 
In Section 2.3.2, we have shown that 1( )E t and 2( )E t are functions of 1( 1)Y t − and 
2 ( 1)Y t − .  So a content equilibrium defined by total production can also be defined by 
endorsement. 
Definition (Content equilibrium 4): A user generated content system is in 
equilibrium if relative endorsement is constant over time, i.e.: 
 
 
2 2
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( ) ( 1)
.( ) ( 1)
E t E t
E t E t
−
=
−
 (40) 
Next proposition states that the three content equilibrium definitions are equivalent. 
Proposition 2.2 (Definition equivalence): Definition 2, 3, and 4 are equivalent. 
See Appendix B for a proof. 
This result allows us to define content equilibrium from the first principles, i.e., as a 
state in which consumers have no incentive to change behaviors, and to prove 
existence of content equilibrium from one of its equivalences—that normalized 
endorsements no longer change.   
 Content users care for nothing but their own personal interests in a way similar 
to consumers and producers in a market behave.  Adam Smith (Smith 1776) sees an 
invisible hand guiding an economic system despite seemingly chaotic actions by 
selfish individuals.  A similar question arises for content system.  Can a decentralized 
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content system settle to a harmony?  Does equilibrium have some socially desirable 
features?  And is equilibrium fragile?  These are the questions addressed in the rest of 
this section.    
Proposition 2.3 (Existence): In a content system, a content equilibrium by definition 
2 exists, with the property: 
 
 
22
1 1
( ) 1 ,  for all .( )
E t
t
E t
α
α
= +
 
See Appendix B for a proof. 
This result implies that, it is possible for a content system to have a state in which 
consumers have no incentives to change their behaviors. We have argued that 
producers may still change their behaviors at equilibrium.  Nevertheless, consumers 
and producers, despite knowing nothing about others’ decisions, can be compatible in 
the sense that endorsements given by consumers and endorsements received by 
producers are equal.  Note that compatibility can be easily achieved in an out-of-
equilibrium world in which individual can adjust their behaviors when environment 
changes.  But it is much harder when individuals do not change their behaviors.  This 
is the crust of price equilibrium (Arrow and Debreu 1954).  This result shows 
compatibility when consumers do not change behavior while producers still do.  
 
 The content consumer specification that quantity is inverse to search cost is 
important to equilibrium result.  This specification captures the opposing effects of 
sampling probabilities on demand.  On the one hand, higher total supply of one quality 
type relative to the other quality type (and hence higher sampling probability) 
increases the demand by lowering search cost. On the other hand, relatively high total 
supply reduces the unit endorsement change.  We discuss relaxing this assumption in 
Section 2.5.2. 
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 This equilibrium is robust to production technology.  We use a simple 
specification for content production technology, i.e., 1/2y l= .  However, it can be 
easily verified that choice of production technology does not affect the equilibrium 
results.  Thus our model admits a wide range of production technology. The important 
supply side condition is that producers are motivated by endorsement. 
 The characterization of content equilibrium is puzzling.  We have 
demonstrated that interaction of demand and supply gives rise to the content 
equilibrium.  But the quantitative feature of content equilibrium only depends on the 
demand condition—preference 1 2 and α α .  This explains why the specification of 
production technology does not affect equilibrium endorsement.  One-sided 
equilibrium first appears in Paul Samuelson’s Non substitution Theorem (Samuelson 
1951). Samuelson shows that an equilibrium price system depends only on the supply 
condition when technology is constant-return-to-scale. Our model provides a 
complementary case where demand is inversely related to the demand condition—
search cost.  We will use this result to show that the size of endorsement received by a 
high quality producer may be larger than what his quality warrants in Proposition 2.7.    
 We have shown existence by the second definition of content equilibrium in 
which consumers have no incentive to change behaviors.  We can show that when 
time is sufficiently large, producers in a content system will have no incentive to 
change their behaviors.  
Proposition 2.4 (Production in asymptotic equilibrium): In content equilibrium 
when time is large, producers do not change their productions, i.e., ( )iy t is a constant 
for 1, 2i = when t → ∞ .  In another word, a content equilibrium by definition 1 exists 
when time is large. 
See Appendix B for a proof. 
This result suggests that period production increases in short-run, and hit a ceiling in 
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long-run.  Therefore producers will not change their behaviors in the equilibrium 
defined by stability of consumer behaviors. It implies that the equilibrium by 
Definition 1 exists when time is large.  Therefore it is possible for consumer and 
producer to be compatible when neither of them changes behavior.  
 We have shown that selfish individuals in a content system can reach a state of 
balance.  Next we ask whether such a state is socially desirable.  This is a relevant 
question to potential regulators of content platforms. Policy makers are interested in 
improving consumer welfare. So we examine whether the content equilibrium can be 
used as a benchmark for consumer welfare.  First, we need to define a set of allocation 
1 2( , )x x that the content equilibrium allocation is compared against.  In market context, 
optimality of competitive equilibrium is established by comparison with all allocations 
that clear market.  Content does not clear, so market clearing allocation no long 
applies to content.  A natural candidate in a content system is the set of allocations that 
clears endorsement.   
Definition (Endorsement clearing allocation): An endorsement clearing allocation 
1 2( , )x x  satisfies 1 2 2
1 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ).( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
x t x t
t
Y
e
Y t Y t t
+ ∆=
− + − −
 
This definition states the fact that unit endorsement for high quality content comes 
from the high quality consumer as well as the low quality consumer. 
Proposition 2.5 (Optimality): When the outside goods supply is fixed, i.e., 
1 2
o o ox x x+ = , the content equilibrium is Pareto optimal among endorsement clearing 
allocation for any fixed 2 ( )e t∆ . 
See Appendix B for a proof. 
This result suggests that content systems, despite that individuals care for only their 
own interests, are socially desirable in terms of consumer welfare.  This result is 
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surprising in light of the inequality observed in Figure 3 and 4 and to discuss in details 
in Section 2.4.  Inequality may alarm lawmakers because only in an oligopoly market, 
a smaller number of producers produce a lion share.  It is well known that oligopoly 
market is not optimal to consumer welfare.  This result eases such concern. 
 We have established that content equilibrium is a desirable state.  But as 
implied by system dynamic in Section 2.3.2, there exist numerous configurations of a 
content system.  The content equilibrium is only one of infinitely many states a 
content system can be in.  So an important question is how a system reaches 
equilibrium, and whether it will stay there. This question is relevant to empirical 
research.  Researchers have been increasingly applying equilibrium as identification 
conditions in empirical analysis.  For example, Nash equilibrium is assumed for 
modeling competition in BLP (1995).  If we can find a force that steer a system 
towards equilibrium, it is more credible to apply equilibrium concept in empirical 
work.  Next we show such a force exists in a content system. 
Definition (Self-organization):  An ability of a content system to steer itself towards 
equilibrium. 
Definition (Stability): A state of content system is asymptotically stable if the system 
converges to the state when elapsed time is large. 
Proposition 2.6 (Stability): Content equilibrium has self-organization feature and is 
asymptotically stable. 
See Appendix B for a proof.   
 In related social network field, researchers have established a distinguishing 
feature of social network—small world phenomenon (Milgram 1967).  Jon Kleinberg 
shows that a decentralized social network not only has short path existing between any 
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two individuals, but also can find it when the social network satisfies certain structural 
property (Kleinberg 2000).  Our result can be interpreted in a similar way—a content 
system not only has an optimal state, but also can find it in a decentralized manner 
when the system has a simple behavioral property—demand is inverse to search cost. 
This specification generates a “gradient” feature for the content system.  A second 
related model is in market theory.  The competitive market equilibrium was first 
established by a fixed-point argument (Kakutani 1941).  But it is a static framework, 
and questions remained as to how a market arrives at its equilibrium.  So researchers 
built an elaborate dynamic structure called the aˆtonnT ement process to show how 
price system settles to its equilibrium (Arrow and Hahn 1971).    
 It is not a coincidence that three models: price adjustment model, Kleinberg’s 
small world search model, and content equilibrium model, despite different 
specifications and applications (namely, market, social network, and content system), 
all fall into a class of mathematical models.11  It is established by Liapunov theory that 
if a dynamic system satisfies certain conditions, it can reach stability.  Upon 
examination, our model provides another case analogous to the list of stable dynamic 
systems found in the physics and biological literature. To show that the system is 
stable, we begin by defining a function 2 2(.) :f R R→  that models the dynamics of 
endorsement, taking 1( )E t and 2 ( )E t  and producing 1( 1)E t + and 2( 1)E t + : 
 
1 1 1 1
2 1 2 2
2
2
( 1) ( ( ), ( )) ( 1) ( ),
( 1) ( ( ), ( )) ( 1) ( ).
E t f E t E t t E t
E t f E t E t t E t
e
e
+ = + +
+ +
∆
∆+ =
≡
≡
 (41) 
2 2
1 1
( 1)
where 1( 1)
e
e
t
t
α
α
∆
∆
+
= +
+
.  We define 2*(.) :V R R→ as a distance measure.  
                                                 
11
 Kleinberg (2000) does not make the connection between the search model and Liapunov function.   
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22 2
1 2
1 1
(*( , ) 1 .)EV E E
E
α
α
−≡ −  (42) 
The key idea in showing stability is to find a function that summarizes the stable 
variable.  Recall the definition of the discrete version of a Liapunov function 
(Luenberger 1979): 
Definition (discrete Liapunov function): Let Ω  denote state space, and let X ∈Ω  
denote the state variable.  The state variable evolves by ( 1) ( ( ))X t f X t+ = .  A 
Liapunov function ( )V X satisfies the following properties: (a) ( )V X is continuous; 
(b) ( )V X has a unique minimum at X ∈Ω ; (c) ( ( )) ( ) 0V f X V X− ≤ . 
We can verify that *(.)V is a Liapunov function.  Therefore, the content system is 
stable.   
2.4  Endogenous Endorsement and Sampling Probability 
 The content equilibrium outlined in the last section allows us to discuss 
persistent patterns on endogenous variables in a content system.  We characterize 
distribution of endorsement and sampling probability arising from the content 
equilibrium in Section 2.4.1, and show that a content system is selective.  Other forces 
not discussed in the previous section may also affect extent of the selectiveness.  We 
consider three of them: incomplete endorsement, search by endorsement, and entry of 
new producer in Section 2.4.2. 
2.4.1 Baseline Results 
 Content equilibrium in Proposition 2.3 immediately gives rise to the following 
result. 
Proposition 2.7 (Inequality in Endorsement and Sampling Probability): At the 
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content equilibrium, the high quality producer has more unit endorsement than low 
quality producer regardless of consumer preferences.  Consequently, the high quality 
producer produces more content than the low quality producer.  High quality content 
has high sampling probability, that is, high quality content is easier to find than low 
quality content, which is a collaborative filtering mechanism.  Finally, the size of 
inequality is independent from the difference in producer quality.  Formally, 
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
1E Y m
E Y m
α
α
= = = + , and 2 2 2
1 1 1
, ,
E Y m
E Y m
 are independent from 1 2,p pz z . 
See Appendix B for a proof. 
First, this result shows that the ratio of cumulative endorsements, total productions, 
and sampling probabilities are equivalent.  Therefore, result on endorsement applies to 
the other two.  This proposition is motivated by the endorsement inequality in a 
precise form—power-law distribution observed in Figure 3.  Existing models (e.g. 
Yule 1925) generates power-law distribution via a rich-gets-richer process.  However, 
which party ends up being the richer one is unclear.  Almost any producer can become 
a superstar (Alder 1985).  This proposition states that producer quality matters in 
deciding who gets rich in the first place.  Second, Simon (1971) raises the important 
issue of designing organization to promote high quality information in an information 
rich world.  In the same spirit, the content system in this paper promotes high quality 
content in a content rich world despite that users are un-organized and selfish.  
Incomplete substitution behavior drives a content system to select high quality 
producer with the aid of technology which makes content non-rival and enables 
producers to reach a large number of consumers.  Third, producer quality plays a 
limited role in determining endorsement distribution.  Higher quality producer earns 
more endorsement.  But how much more is independent from quality difference.  It is 
argued in labor literature that compensation for top-level management is often 
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disproportional larger than those for employees although skill differences may be 
small (Lazearand and Rosen 1981).  Our result suggests that higher quality producers 
may earn disproportional endorsement and produce disproportional content although 
difference in quality may be small. 
2.4.2 Other Forces  
 We discuss three forces which are not in the basic model, but influence 
endorsement and sampling probabilities.  
Incomplete Endorsement 
 Endorsement is generated from demand.  In the basic model, we assume that 
an endorsement is given to a piece of content as long as a consumer’s quality demand 
is met.  This simple assumption is possible from a cost point of view because the cost 
to endorse is so low.  But consumers may choose not to endorse for a variety of 
reasons—they may not be familiar with the endorsement mechanism, or they may 
forget, for example. Such incomplete endorsements are analogous to non-responses in 
a survey.   
 We examine how incomplete endorsement rate impacts the inequality.  
Suppose 1 2,β β are the percentages of the demand that translate into endorsements for 
each type of consumers. Then the total endorsements during time t are: 
 
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 2
1 1 2
2 1 1 2
2
2
1 2
2
2
( 1)
'( ) ( ) ( ) ,( 1) ( 1)
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e t x t m t
w Y t Y t
Y t
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w w Y t Y t
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−
= =
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−
= + = +
− + −
 (43) 
and the new equilibrium is: 
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1 11
'( ) 1 .
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E t
E t
α β
α β= +  (44) 
Proposition 2.8 (Incomplete endorsement): The outcome of the equilibrium favors 
the more highly-endorsed quality. 
See Appendix B for a proof. 
This result suggests that if consumers want content with a certain level of quality, they 
should endorse in order to encourage greater production of such content.  Therefore, 
both high and low quality producers can gain advantage depending on whether high 
and low consumers endorse more.  In contrast, the next force we discuss only favors 
high quality producer. 
  
Endorsement in searching 
 In the basic model, each piece of content has equal sampling probability.  
However, if high quality content is easier to find (and hence has lower search cost) 
than low quality content, the inequality can be further skewed to high quality.  This is 
possible because endorsement carries information on where to locate high quality 
content.  Consumers can return to the producers they endorse in the previous period to 
find satisfactory content.  In this sense, endorsement has important carry-over effects 
over time. It rewards high quality producers not only in current period, but also in 
future periods.   
 Suppose consumers decide to return to the producers they endorsed in the last 
period.  Then the sampling probability should be weighted by unit endorsement: 
 
1 1
1
1 1 2 1
2 2
2 21 2
2
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( ) , ( ) .( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
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(45) 
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The total endorsements are  
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 (46) 
Proposition 2.9 (Search by endorsement): When endorsement is used in search, 
endorsement is further skewed towards high quality producers in the next period. 
See Appendix B for a proof. 
This result implies that when endorsement is used for search, the unit endorsement 
will increase even when the equilibrium point in the basic model is surpassed, i.e., 
2 1 2 1( ) / /( 1)tE t E α α> + . This process can repeat over time, causing the inequality to 
become further skewed towards high quality content.  This is similar to a preferential 
attachment (“rich-get-richer”) process which may lead to a power-law distribution.  
The basic model in Section 2.3 creates an initial inequality based on producer quality.  
Search by endorsement amplifies the quality induced inequality.   
Entry of new producers 
 Competing forces also exist that counterbalance the system to skew towards 
higher quality content for existing producers.  In particular, new producers are not 
subject to the system dynamics.  They have not received unequal endorsement.  
Therefore their entry may bring equal production, which increases the relative amount 
of low quality content for existing producers.   
 Suppose that there are equal numbers of new producers for low and high 
quality content.  Since they are new producers, they have not yet received 
endorsements. Thus no one of them is motivated to produce more content than any 
 75 
other, so the new producers are likely to contribute equal amounts of content.  
Suppose that a content system is in equilibrium, and Y∆  new content are added at 
each quality level at the end of period of 1t − .  Then the sampling probabilities are: 
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 (47) 
We have the following result on content sampling probability in comparison to the 
basic model. 
Proposition 2.10 (Entry of new producers): Entry of new producers reduces the 
skew towards higher quality content in terms of sampling probability in short term.  In 
long run, however, the system returns to the equilibrium described in Proposition 7.    
See Appendix B for a proof. 
Firstly, this result implies that entry of new producer change inequality in sampling 
probability favoring the low quality content temporarily.  In long term, the inequality 
between low and quality content will return to its equilibrium state.  Secondly, there is 
an inequality between new and existing producers of the same quality because new 
producers have not been subjected to selection of content system. But in long term, 
both will have the same sampling probability.  So an insight is that inequality in the 
basic model is independent from time sequence producers enter into a content system. 
 Timing of entry may matter when inequality depends on particular features of 
producers which are time dependent.  Search by endorsement is one example.  
Suppose that in period 1t − , a content system is in equilibrium, and consumers start 
searching by endorsement.  In addition,
 
Y∆  new content are added at each quality 
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level. We assume that consumers sample content of new producers by probability a .  
Then the sampling probabilities are:  
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while the total endorsements are: 
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Proposition 2.11 (Entry of new producers with search by endorsement): Entry of 
new producers reduces overall skew towards higher quality content for existing 
producers.  Existing high quality producer enjoys more inequality than new high 
quality producers. 
See Appendix B for a proof. 
When consumers do not use endorsement in search, new producer will have the same 
inequality as existing producers of the same quality.  But when consumers search by 
endorsement, the initial gap in endorsement between new and existing producers will 
persist in long run.  This result highlights the fact that a process that depends on 
producer characteristics, e.g. endorsement, may give advantage to established 
producers.  Searching by endorsement or not, both Proposition 2.10 and 2.11 show 
that entry of new producers help reduce skew to high quality producers in sampling 
probability.  As we will show in Section 2.6, reducing inequality is consistent with 
policy to implement profit goal for content website providers.  Therefore, content 
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website providers should invest to attract new producers.     
2.5  Extending Basic Model 
 We first show how to extend the basic model from two qualities to any finite 
number of qualities in Section 2.5.1. The basic model assumes that demand is inverse 
to search cost, and demand decision is independent of production decision. We discuss 
relaxing these conditions in Section 2.5.2 and Section 2.5.3 respectively.  
2.5.1 Multiple Qualities 
 We only discuss two qualities, consumers, and producers for simplicity in the 
basic model.  But the inequality in Figure 3 and 4 suggests that inequality spans across 
multiple producers which cannot be explained by the basic model.  We show how to 
extend the equilibrium model from two qualities to the case of any arbitrary finite 
number I  qualities 1 ... Iz z< < .  The preference parameters are 1,..., Iα α .  It can be 
shown that the average number of steps required to find a piece of content for 
threshold quality iz
 
is 
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 (50) 
The demand of the consumer with threshold quality iz
 
is 
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The endorsement during period t
 
for producers of quality iz
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The unit endorsement increase during period t is 
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Therefore, the ratio between the unit endorsement increase for quality iz and quality 
1z is 
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where 2 i I≤ ≤ .  Therefore the equilibrium in the two quality model can be extended 
to the case of I  qualities. The regularity again appears in the distribution of 
production in the equilibrium, that is: 
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This result and search by endorsement in Section 2.4 provide a rich-gets-richer process 
on multiple qualities that may lead to power-law distribution in Figure 3 and 4.  This 
result implies that among high quality producers, some will produce more than others 
due to finer differentiation in quality. 
2.5.2 Bounds for Nonlinear Demand 
 The basic model assumes that demand is linear to the inverse search cost.  
More generally, demand can decrease with price in a nonlinear way; for example, an 
alternative demand specification (Hendel 1999 and Dube 2004) has the following 
form: 
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1/(1 )(1/ ) .i ix p η−∝  (57) 
In this definition, the parameter (0,1)η ∈ controls the shape of the function, with 0η =  
making it linear.  Note that Hendel and Dube model joint decisions of product and 
quantity, while quality preferences are given in our model.  Interestingly, Dube (2004) 
estimates that 0.009η =  for soft drinks, which makes quantity almost linear in 1 / ip .  
In the case where linearity is not a good approximation, we can still use the content 
equilibrium in the basic model to establish bounds on the content system behavior.   
 We have shown that the content system evolves around a constant—the ratio 
of unit endorsement increase 2 1( ) / ( )e t e t∆ ∆ , where in particular the state variable 
12 ( ) / ( )E t E t  always moves towards 2 1( ) / ( )e t e t∆ ∆ .  When the demand is not linear to 
the inverse of search cost, 2 1( ) / ( )e t e t∆ ∆  is no longer a constant, but we can still 
characterize the system. The idea is that if we can bound 2 1( ) / ( )e t e t∆ ∆ , we can learn 
the range of system dynamics.  We use Hendel and Dube’s specification as an 
example.  Under Hendel and Dube’s specification, quantity demanded is proportional 
to a function of sampling probability mθ , where 1θ > .  Without loss of generality, let 
the new demand in the two-quality case be 
 
2
1
1
22( ) , ( ) ( ) .x t x t m t
w w
θα α
τ τ
= =  (58) 
Proposition 2.12 (Bounds for non-linear demand): There exist bounds for 
equilibrium endorsement ratio, i.e., 2 2 21
1 1 1
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See Appendix B for a proof.   
 This result provides a different approach for researchers to characterize content 
system when the condition for a sharp result in Section 2.3 is not available. We show 
that the bounds are informative on the distinguishing feature outlined in Section 2.4—
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a content system is selective.  Using Hendel and Dube’s specification, inequality still 
exists because the lower bound for equilibrium unit endorsement 2 1( ) / ( ) 1E t E t >  for 
all (0,1)θ ∈  although it is less skewed when compared to the linear case because now 
the linear case equilibrium 2 11 /α α+ is the upper bound.  This result together with the 
result in Section 2.3 raise interesting observations on the relationship between 
individual behavior and macro outcome.  Under a simple assumption—demand is 
inverse to search cost, we arrive at an equilibrium with desirable features: optimality 
and stability.  Then we assume consumers are more sophisticated and they can do 
more complex thinking as implied by Eq. 32.  But even under the more general 
assumption, a content system still works towards desirable states: high quality content 
is filtered and high quality producers are rewarded.  Tough we do not study origin of 
individual behavior in this paper, our results provide cases to study how individual 
behavior is developed in the first place from sociobiology and evolutionary 
psychology point of views (Wilson 1975 and Buss 1995).   
2.5.3 Dependence between Consumption and Production 
 An important feature of a content system is that content users both consume 
and produce content.  In the basic model, the decisions to consume and produce 
contents were assumed to be independent. In this section, we relax this assumption and 
incorporate a dependency caused by scarcity of time in our model.  A user spends time 
in search as a consumer and in production as a producer.  The two activities compete 
for limited time.  The quasilinear utility in the basic model implies that consumption 
of content is not sensitive to total wealth. To study dependency case, we assume 
consumers have time budget 1q and 2q for consuming content and an alternative goods. 
Recall the time 1l and 2l used in producing content.  The total time budgets for 
consumption and production are 1 1 1T q l= +
 
and  2 2 2T q l= + .  In order to have the 
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consumption as a function of budget, we use a Cobb-Douglas utility function instead 
of quasilinear utility function: 
 
( ), ( )
max ln ( ) (1 ) ln ( )
s.t.   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,   1, 2,
t x ti ix o
i
i i o
i
i i o
i
o i
x t x t
p t x t p t x t W i
α α+ −
+ = =
 (59) 
where ( )op t is the price of the outside goods.  
Note that the linearity of demand in the inverse of search cost is no longer sufficient 
for equilibrium because the unit endorsement change is no longer a constant:  
 
2 2 2
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q t
α
α
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∆
∆
 (60) 
But we next show that a content system may still reach equilibrium due to the time 
constraint.  A content equilibrium with dependent consumption and production 
solves the following equation system: 
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               (equilibrium condition).            ( 1)
E t
E t
−
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 (61) 
Proposition 2.13 (Existence of content equilibrium when consumption and 
production are dependent for a user): A sufficient condition for a content 
equilibrium to exist is that the high quality user commits more overall time than the 
low quality user, i.e., 2 1T T> .  There are multiple (an infinite number of) equilibria. 
Inequality in endorsement and production still exists in the equilibria.  
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See Appendix B for a proof.   
We have shown that, when consumption and production are independent, content 
equilibrium exists when demand is inverse to search cost.  This result shows that when 
consumption and production are dependent, under the condition that high quality users 
spend more time in content activities, content equilibrium also exists.  With 
independent consumption and production, there is a single equilibrium which implies 
that only one set of consumer and producer behaviors will be compatible.  This result 
shows multiple equilibria which imply that multiple sets of consumer and producer 
behaviors will be compatible for dependent consumption and production.  It is not 
surprising that inequality still holds at equilibria because imperfect substitution and 
technology are still the micro foundations in this model.  The essence of the basic 
model in Section 2.3 is interaction—production depends on endorsement from 
consumer.  The insight extends to this case, i.e., one type of users’ allocations of their 
time between consumption and production will influence allocations of the other type.  
So we expect that interaction pattern emerges across equilbiria.  First we check 
whether consumption times 1q and 2q are related at equilibria between high and low 
quality users. We examine the relationship between the two quantities by using a 
simulation. For simplicity, we set preference and total time as 1 2 1α α= = , 1 1,T =  and 
2 2T = .  We find that  2q
 
is increasing in 1q
 
as shown in Figure 6.  An explanation is 
that when the low quality user increases consumption time, their production time 
decreases as does their production.  Therefore, it takes fewer pieces of high quality 
content for the high quality user to earn the same quantity of endorsements, freeing 
him to spend more time consuming high quality content.  This result raises an 
interesting question on inequality.  When high quality users increase consumption, 
dependency implies high quality production will drop.  Does an increase in 
consumption time by low quality user lead to reduction in inequality?  So next we 
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check the behavior of the equilibrium endorsement ratio 12 ( ) / ( )E t E t as a function of 
the low quality user’s consumption time 1q  using the same simulation setup. We find 
the opposite result holds: the equilibrium inequality increases in 1q
 
as shown in Figure 
7.  Therefore, inequality is further skewed towards high quality user.  An intuition is 
that, both types of users reduce production.  So reduction of production by high 
quality users is offset by reduction of production by low quality users. In addition, 
increase in consumption by low quality user implies increase in endorsement for both 
low and high quality users.  But increase in consumption by high quality user implies 
increase in endorsement for only high quality users.   
 
Figure 6   Consumption Time by High Quality User as a Function of Consumption 
Time by Low Quality User.   
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Figure 7   Endorsement Ratio as a Function of Consumption Time by Low Quality 
User 
 
2.5.4 Content Quality Ranking12 
 In the basic model in Section 2.3, we assume that there exists a universal 
ranking of content quality for all users.  But in reality there may be multiple rankings 
of content quality.  Multiple rankings raise interesting dynamics of the model.  We use 
the basic model for a heuristic discussion.  Rather than having one population of 
                                                 
12
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for motivating this discussion. 
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consumers agreeing upon one ranking, there exists two populations holding two exact 
opposite ranking orders, i.e., 2 1z z> in ranking order 1, and 2 1z z< in ranking order 2.  
In first case, we assume equal sizes for the two populations.  There won’t be inequality 
in endorsement, production, and sampling probability.   In second case, suppose that 
the population with ranking order 1 has a larger size, then inequality will arise in favor 
of population 1.  Another interesting case emerges if we introduce learning into 
consumer behavior.  For example, consumers may modify their quality ranking based 
on the overall ranking presented by the system.  We leave this to future research. 
2.6  Managing Content System 
 In this section, we illustrate managerial implications of our analysis. The site 
provider wields significant influence over the design and operation of a content-
sharing website.  In particular, the site providers have influence on the mechanisms by 
which consumers search new content—the order in which content is ranked in 
response to a keyword search, for example, or the choice of which content is 
“featured” on the main page. The importance of these decisions is borne out by our 
analysis, which shows that the sampling probability is a key factor influencing 
consumer behavior.  How the site providers engineer the sampling probability depends 
on their objectives.  They can simultaneously be a central planner that considers the 
welfare of consumers, and a profit maximizer that considers its own well-being.  In 
addition, the providers may also have a goal of engineering diversity since part of the 
appeal of Web 2.0 lies in its democratic nature.  We want to highlight the tension 
among these objectives.  We discuss the role of central planner in Section 2.6.1, and 
the role of profit maximizer in Section 2.6.2.  And the role of diversity promoters is 
discussed in both sections. 
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2.6.1 Central planner  
 A strategy for improving consumer welfare is to increase the average quality of 
the content on the site—to maximize the expected quality, ii
i
m z c−∑ , where c  is the 
cost of adjusting the sampling probability.  The solution is then 1,  if im i I= = , and 
0,  otherwiseim = , where I denotes the maximum possible quality index.  The 
downside of this objective is that it leads to a concentration of sampling probability on 
the best quality content.   An alternative objective would be  
 
2max .
i
i i i
m i
i
i
m z m cλ− −∑ ∑  (62) 
where the second term penalizes the concentration of sampling probability on a 
particular quality.  This is a similar idea to regularization methods in the statistics 
literature. The added penalization term ensures that the sampling probabilities are 
continuously distributed among content of different quality, and therefore is consistent 
with Web 2.0’s democratic objective.  The optimal solution then is  
 
/ 2.i i im zλ=  (63) 
2.6.2  Profit maximization 
 Content website providers may profit from selling services to producers. An 
example is Flickr’s “Pro account” feature, which removes storage and bandwidth 
limits in exchange for a yearly membership fee. A natural way to increase the sales of 
Pro accounts would be to motivate producers to make and upload more content. From 
the two quality case discussed in Section 2.3, it is clear that the unit endorsement 
change is an increasing function of sampling probability. We provide a heuristic 
argument on how a content site provider may adjust sampling probability to increase 
the amount of production.  Recall that the unit endorsement increase for quality iz  
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from Section 2.5.1 is 
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 (64) 
where 2/ (2 )K wψ τ= .  A content site provider may wish to encourage production, 
because content suppliers are more likely to purchase additional services (such as 
extra storage or bandwidth) when they produce more content.  For simplicity, we 
assume that the purchase probability is proportional to the total content output.  So in 
period t, for producer i, the purchase probability is ( ) ( 1[ ) ( 1)] /i i ity y t Y t B+ − + −∆ , 
where B
 
is a normalizing constant for probability definition.  Note that for the service 
that removes storage/bandwidth limit, the producers of quality *i iz z≥  already have 
the service because their total production iY
 
has surpassed the storage/bandwidth limit. 
In this case, we only consider the producers of quality *i iz z< .  Suppose that the price 
for the service is sp .  Then expected revenue for producer i
 
in period t 
is ( ) ( 1) ( 1)i i is
t y t Y typ
B
+ − + −∆
.  Then a profit maximization problem is 
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 (65) 
It can be rearranged to  
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The optimal sampling probability is 
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 (67) 
Suppose that the system is in equilibrium during the previous period 1t − , then recall 
from Section 2.5.1 that 1 1 1( 1) ( ... ) ( 1) /i iY t Y tα α α− = + + − .  Then the optimal sampling 
probability becomes 
 
1
1
( ) .( 1)
s
i
i
p K
m t
Y tB
α
γ
=
−
 (68) 
If the penalizing weights iγ ’s are equal, then the optimal sampling probabilities are 
also equal for all qualities.  The intuition for this result is as follows.  High quality 
content receives more endorsements than low quality content due to imperfect 
substitution and technology.  But there is also more high quality content in the system 
than low quality content.  So from a unit endorsement standpoint, it makes no 
difference for the content site provider to promote one quality of content over the 
other.  Note that if the inequality is further skewed than in the basic model, we will 
have optimal sampling probability decreasing in the quality.  This result implies the 
tension between profit maximization and consumer welfare.  Interestingly, profit 
maximization requires promoting content diversity in production.  
2.7  Conclusion 
 Our main contribution is to provide an analysis of system behavior of content 
systems and individuals.  Due to the large amount of content available, the consumers 
face a search problem.  Our empirical analysis shows the producers are motivated by 
endorsement. We construct a simple model to show the system can reach equilibrium 
based on these myopic behaviors.  The content equilibrium has good properties such 
as optimality and stability.  Our results show that endorsement is not only important 
for encouraging individual producers, but also crucial to enable the system to work 
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together. 
 We address an important macro phenomenon. We give empirical evidence of 
inequality in endorsement and production, showing that they follow power law 
distributions.  The micro-foundation needed is Rosen’s imperfect substitution and 
technology.  The content mechanism we describe fills the link from the micro 
foundation to the macro phenomenon.  We also show that incomplete endorsement, 
search by endorsement, and entry of new producers may impact the inequality.   
 We provide managerial insights to content site providers.  Site providers are 
both private businesses and hosts of a public platform for social activities; therefore 
their objectives are both related and competing.  
 Our analysis has a number of practical implications. We provide a theoretical 
motivation for consumer behavior researchers to consider simultaneity and 
endogeneity issue.  We provide a framework for the design and management purpose 
of content system providers.  We provide a benchmark of consumer welfare for policy 
makers who regulate content platforms. 
 We have kept our model simple to show the essence to a content equilibrium.  
We also have extended the basic model to more general conditions, but even further 
extensions can be made.  For example, the basic model assumes the same production 
technology for high and low quality producers.  Heterogeneous production technology 
can be explored, which may give further advantage to high quality producers.  Another 
direction is that consumers can find search information through some form of learning.  
If the learning involves their friends, social networks may also impact the equilibrium.  
 It is well-known that a market is the benchmark mechanism with many good 
properties for a decentralized system with myopic decision-makers.  So the larger 
question for this research is, does a similar mechanism exist in a different environment 
where price is missing and non-rivalry is present?  This paper suggests the existence 
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of such a mechanism. This mechanism is selective, and therefore inequality is bound 
to arise.  On the upside, the system is a collaborative filter for high quality content.   
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APPENDIX A 
Proof of Proposition 1.1 
Take derivative of 2( )f σ with respect to σ .  We have 
 2 2
exp( )
' (1 exp( ))
j
j
Xf
X
γ β γσ
β γσ
+
=
+ +
 
Then 2 0'f ≤ .  So 2f and 1f can only have one intercept. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.2: 
a) And we observe that lim lim( | ) 0, ( | ) 1,  f r a l *o l  s ss sσ γ σ γ γ γ→−∞ →∞= = < .   Let the 
support for ( | )sσ γ be ( , )−∞ ∞ . ( | )sσ γ is non-decreasing in s , and continuous.  So 
( | )sσ γ is a cumulative distribution function of s . 
b) Rewrite equation (25) to ( | ) log ( | ) log(1 ( | ))s s s sβ γσ γ σ γ σ γ+ = − − .  Since s is 
continuous in ( | )sσ γ on (0,1) , ( | )sσ γ is continuous in s on ( , )−∞ ∞ . Take derivative 
with respect to s in the interior of support, we obtain   
 
1( | ) 1[ ]( | )(1 ( | ))
s
ds s s
dσ γ β γ
σ γ σ γ
−
= −
−
 (69) 
So ( | ) / 0sd s dσ γ > for 0γ < .  Note that ( | )(1inf(1 (/ [ ) 4| ))]s sσ γ σ γ− = .  Now 
consider 0 *γ γ< < . So a sufficient condition for ( | ) / 0sd s dσ γ > to hold is 4γ < .  
However, ( | )sσ γ is also a function of γ .  So if 4γ > , ( | ) / 0sd s dσ γ > may still hold.  
Note in our case, 4γ < holds because we observe that * 3.5γ ≤ from Figure 1.g 
c) We fix the salary s .  Then Eq. (25) defines an implicit function of ( | )sσ γ .  And 
( | )sσ γ  is continuous in ( *),γ−∞ .  Take derivative with respect to γ in ( *),γ−∞ , we 
obtain 
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1( | ) 1[ ]( | )(1 ( | ))
s
s s
d
d
σ γ
σ γ
γ σ γ σ γ
−
= −
−
 (70) 
So | 0( )sd
d
σ γ
γ
> for * 4γ γ< < .   
d) The statement immediately follows from b). 
e) Proof by contradiction.  If 1B does not exists, then 21( | ) / ( | ) /d s ds d s dsσ γ σ γ≥ in 
the entire interior of support.  It implies 1 2( | ) ( | )s sσ γ σ γ≥ , contradicting to the first 
order dominance statement in b).  If 2B does not exists, then 
1 2lim ( | ) lim ( | ) 1s ss sσ γ σ γ→∞ →∞< = , contradicting to the fact that 1lim ( | ) 1s sσ γ→∞ = .   
f) The statement follows from equation (69). 
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APPENDIX B 
Proof of Proposition 2.1 
Check Eq. (28).   
Proof of Proposition 2.2 
The equivalence between Definition 2 and 3 is evident.  To prove the equivalence of 
Definition 3 and 4, use Equation (36) and (39).  We find that 
2 1 2 1( ) / ( ) ( 1) / ( 1)Y t Y t Y t Y t= − − holds if and only if 12 ( ) / ( )y t y t is constant over time, 
and if and only if 2
1
( )
( )
E t
E t
is a constant over time by Eq. (38).    
Proof of Proposition 2.3 
We plug the unit endorsement of Eq. (35) into Definition 4 of equilibrium and use the 
ratio of unit endorsement increase of Eq.(34).  A solution exists.  The content system 
is in equilibrium if and only if:  
 
2 2
1
2
11
( ) ( ) 1 .( ) ( )
E t e t
E t e t
α
α
= = +
∆
∆
 (71) 
Proof of Proposition 2.4 
By the second definition of content equilibrium, 12( ) / ( )Y t Y t is a constant over time.  
Therefore, period endorsements available 1 2( ), ( )e t e t are fixed by Eq. (30).  Since 
period productions 1( )y t and 2 ( )y t are positive, 1( )Y t and 2 ( )Y t are increasing, and unit 
endorsement changes 0ie∆ → for 1, 2i = as t → ∞  by Eq. (33).  Therefore 
accumulated per unit endorsements 21( ), ( )E t E t will not change, and period 
productions 21( ), ( )y t y t become stable. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.5 
A Pareto efficient allocation is to maximize the utility of one consumer while holding 
the utility of the other consumer at a given level 2u .  
 
1
1
1
1 1
2
2
, )
2
(
2
) (max ln ( ) ( )
such that ln ( ) ( ) .
o
ox t
o
x t
x t x t
x t x ut
α
α
+
+ =
 (72) 
From the endorsement clearing allocation definition, we have 
 
2
2 2 2 1
1 2
( 1)( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ).( 1) ( 1)
Y t
x t t Y t x t
Y Y
e
t t
−
− −
− + −
∆=  (73) 
Substituting 2 ( )x t to the objective function, we have the unconstrained maximization 
problem: 
 
1 1 1 2 2 2
max ln ( ) ln ( ) ,x ox t x t x uα α+ + −  (74) 
which has the first order condition: 
 
2 2 2
1 1 1 2
( ) ( 1)
.( ) ( 1) ( 1)
x t Y t
x t Y t Y t
α
α
−
=
− + −
 (75) 
In the content equilibrium,  
 
1 2
1 2
2
2
1
,  .
Y
x x
w w Y Y
α α
τ τ
= =
+
 (76) 
So the necessary condition for Pareto optimality is satisfied. So the content 
equilibrium is optimal in terms of consumer welfare. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.6 
First, we show that a content system with consumers and producers has a self-
organizing feature.  This fact can be seen by noting that if the unit endorsement ratio is 
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greater than the equilibrium value, i.e., 2
1
2
1
( 1) 1( 1)
E t
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α
−
> +
−
, then the system will reduce 
the ratio in the next period, i.e., 2 2
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−
.  If the unit endorsement ratio is 
smaller than the equilibrium value, i.e., 2
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, then the system will increase 
the ratio in the next period, i.e., 2 2
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E t E t
−
>
−
.  This self-adjusting process will 
eventually lead the system to equilibrium regardless of the initial system state.   
 Formally, we define two sequences.  The first sequence is 
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'(0) 1
'(0)
E
E
α
α
≤ + ; '( ) '( ) '( 1)i i iE t t E te + −≡ ∆ ,  1, 2i = ; 
1 1
2 2'( ) 1
'( )
e t
e t
α
α
∆
∆
= + .  Let us examine 
sequence S .  We find S is monotone decreasing, i.e., 2 2
1 1
( ) ( 1)
( ) ( 1)
E t E t
E t E t −
≤ −  for all t.  S is 
bounded, i.e., 2
1 1
2 ( ) 1( )
E t
E t
α
α
+≥ . Therefore S converges.  The limit cannot be strictly 
greater than 2
1
1 α
α
+  because a smaller 
1
2 ( )
( )
E t
E t
 can be found, so the limit of the sequence 
must be 2
1
1 α
α
+ .  The same argument applies to sequence 'S . 
Proof of Proposition 2.7 
The inequality in unit endorsement holds true because 2
1
2
1
( ) 1( )
E t
E t
α
α
= + , even if 
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preference for low quality may be higher, i.e., 1 2α α> .  The inequality in production 
holds because production per period is linear in unit endorsement.  Therefore, 
2
1
2
1
( ) 1( )
Y t
Y t
α
α
= + when t
 
is large. And it is obvious that high quality content has a higher 
sampling probability, i.e., 2 1m m> .     
Proof of Proposition 2.8 
If the high quality consumer has a higher rate of endorsement, i.e., 2 1β β> , then the 
high quality producer receives larger share of unit equilibrium when compared to the 
basic model, i.e., 2 2
11
'( ) 1
'( )
E t
E t
α
α
> + .  Therefore, the share of higher quality is also higher 
when compared to the basic model, i.e., 2 2
11
'( ) 1
'( )
Y t
Y t
α
α
> + .  The results are opposite if the 
low quality consumer has a higher rate of endorsement, i.e., 2 1β β< . 
Proof of Proposition 2.9 
The unit endorsement increases are: 
 
2
2 2
2
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 2
1 2
1 21 22
( ) ( 1)( ) ,( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( ) ( 1)( ) ,( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1
( )
) ( 1)
e t E t
t
Y t w E t Y t E t Y t
e t E t
t
Y t w E t Y t E t t
e
Y
e
α
α α
−
= =
− − − + − −
+ −
= =
− − − + − −
∆
∆
 (77) 
while the ratio of unit endorsement increase is: 
 
1
2 2 2 2
1 1 1
( ) ( 1) ( 1)(1 ) ,( ) ( 1) ( 1)
t E t E t
t
e
E E te t
α
α
− −
>
−
∆
= +
−∆
 (78) 
and combining Eq. (35) and Eq.  we obtain: 
 
2 2
1 1
( ) ( 1)
.( ) ( 1)
E t E t
E t E t
−
>
−
 (79) 
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Proof of Proposition 2.10 
Note that the relative sampling probability is  
 
2 2 2
1 1 1
( ) ( 1) ( 1)
( ) ( 1) ( 1)
m t Y t Y t
m t Y t Y t
Y
Y
− + −
= <
∆− + −
∆
 (80) 
where 2 2
1 1
( 1) 1 1( 1)
Y t
Y t
α
α
−
= + >
−
is the relative sampling probability in the equilibrium.  
Total endorsements in the next period are 
 
1 1
1 1 1
1 2
1 2
2 1 2
2
2
2
1
( 1)( ) ,( 1) ( 1) 2
( 1)( ) ( .( 1) ( 1) 2
)
Y t
e t x m
w Y t Y t
Y t
e
Y
Y
Y
Y
t x m x
w Y t Y t
α
τ
α α
τ
− +
= =
− + − +
+ − +
= + =
− + − +
∆
∆
∆
∆
 (81) 
So the ratio of unit endorsement between low and high quality content for both 
existing and new producers is still  
 
2 2
1 1
1 .e
e
α
α
+
∆
∆
=
 (82) 
By the self-organization mechanism, new producers will reach the same inequality 
specified in Proposition 7 given enough time. 
Proof of Proposition 2.11  
In the case of search by endorsement without entry of new producers, relative 
sampling probability of high quality content with respect to low quality content in 
period t is 2 2 2
1 11
( ) ( 1) ( 1)
( ) ( 1) ( 1)
m t E t Y t
m t E t Y t
− −
=
− −
.  With entry of new producers, it becomes 
2 2
11 1
2'( ) ( 1) ( 1)
'( ) ( 1) ( 1)
m t E t Y t a
m t E t Y t
Y
Ya
− −
− −
∆+
+ ∆
= .  Therefore, 2 2
1 1
'( ) ( )
'( ) ( )
m t m t
m t m t
< .  The ratio of unit 
endorsement increase between existing high quality content and low quality content is 
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existing producers 
2 2 2
1 1 1
( 1)(1 ) ( 1)
e E t
Ee t
α
α
∆ −
= +
−∆
, while the ratio between new high quality content 
and low quality content is 
new producers 
2 2
1 1
1e
e
α
α
= +
∆
∆
.  
existing producers ne
2 2
1 w prod s1 ucer  
e e
e e
∆ ∆
∆ ∆
> since 2
1
( 1)
( 1)
E t
E t
−
−
by equilibrium condition. 
Proof of Proposition 2.12 
Total endorsements are 
 
1
1 1 1 1
1 2
2 1 2 2 22
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
e t x t m t m t
w
e t x t m t x t m t m t
w w
θ
α
τ
α α
τ τ
= =
= + = +
 (83) 
 Then we have m mθ <  since sampling probability (0,1)im ∈  and 1θ > .  Then  
1
22
2
2 ( ) ( ) ( ).e t m t m
W
w
W
t
w
α α
τ τ
< +  
So   
 
2 2
1 1
( ) 1 .( )
t
t
e
e
α
α
<
∆
+
∆
 (84) 
Hence 2 11 /α α+  is an upper bound for the non-linear demand system.   
 Next we search for a lower bound.  Note that 1mθ −  is increasing in m because 
1 and 0mθ > > .  We know that 1 2 1m m+ = , and 2 1m m>  due to inequality in output, 
so it must be that 2 1/ 2m > .  This gives 12 12m θ θ− −> , so we obtain 12 22m mθ θ−> for all 
2m ,    
 22 2
1(1 )( ) ( ) 2 ( ).e t m t m t
w w
θα α
τ τ
−
−
> +  
Then 
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11 1 2
1
21
2 1 2
1 1( ) ,  ( ) ( 2 ) .( 1) ( 2) ( 1) ( 2)e t e tw Y t Y t w w Y t Y t
θα α α
τ τ τ
−
= >∆ ∆ +
− + − − + −
 
Therefore 
 
2 2
1
1 1
( ) 11 .( ) 2
t
t
e
e θ
α
α −
> +
∆
∆
 (85) 
So 2 1
1
11
2θ
α
α −
+  is a lower bound. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.13 
The system of equations implies that in the equilibrium 2 2
1 1e
E
E
e∆
∆
=  (we omit time t in 
the equilibrium).  Since 2 2 2
1 1 1
E y l
E y l
= = , then we have 
 
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
1 .q T q
q T q
α
α
−
+ =
−
 (86) 
which is 22 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
(1 )q T q
q T q
α
α
−
+ =
−
.  It implies 2 2q T<  when 1 1q T< .  Let 
2
2 1
A
q
α
α
≡ ,
2
1 1
T
T
B
q−
≡ ,
1 1
1
T
C
q
−
−
≡ .  Then we have 22 2(1 )Aq B Cq+ = + , which is 
2 2
2 2(2 ) (1 ) 0A q A C q B+ − + − = .  Solving the quadratic equation, we obtain 
 
2 2
2
( 2 ) (2 ) 4 (1 )
.
2
C A A C A B
q
A
− ± − − −
=
 (87) 
It can be shown that, when the consumption time does not exceed the total time, i.e., 
1 1q T< ,  
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2
2 2 22 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 4 1 1(2 ) 4 (1 ) ( ) 0.TA C A B
q T q q T q T q
α α
α α
− − − = + + >
− − −
 (88) 
Therefore, a solution exists for 2q , i.e., 
 
2 2
2
2 2
2 22 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
22
1 1
(2 ) 4 (1 ) (2 )
2
4 4 4 41 1 1 1( ) ( )
.
2( )
A C A B A C
q
A
T
q T q q T q T q q q T q T q
q
α α α α
α α α α
α
α
− − − − −
=
+ + − + +
− − − − −
=
  
A sufficient condition for a non-negative 2q  is 2 1T T> .  The inequality of endorsement 
and production holds because 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1E y q
E y q
α
α
= = + > . 
 
 
 
 
